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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

ESSAYS ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE

DOMINICAN REFORM PROCESS
by

Julio Gabriel Andujar
Florida International University, 1999

Miami, Florida
Professor Devashish Mitra, Major Professor

This dissertation provides an analytical framework to study the political economy of
policy reform in the Dominican Republic during the nineties. Based on a country study, I
develop two theoretical models that replicate the mechanisms of policy approval in
developing countries with weak democracies. The first model considers a pro-reform
President who submits a tariff bill to an anti-reform Congress dominated by the
opposition party. In between, two opposing lobbies try to get their favored policy
approved. Lobbies act as Stackelberg leaders vis a vis a weak President. The behavior of
the Congress is determined exogenously while the lobbies act strategically pursuing the
approval of the reform bill and indirectly affecting the President's decision. I show that in
such a setting external agents like the Press play an important role in the decision-making
process of the political actors.
The second model presents a similar framework. However, the President, who is a
Stackelberg leader, is allowed only two choices, total reform or status-quo. I show how a

vi

lobby reacts to an increase in its rival's or its own size. These reactions depend on the
President's level of commitment to the reform. Finally, I discuss the effect of variations
in the size of the lobbies on the President's choice. The model suitably explains real
events that took place in the Dominican Republic in the mid-nineties.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The recent wave of economic reforms redefined political relations among different
interest groups in Latin America. The implicit alliance between import-substituting
industrials, urban workers and populist governments that sustained the old inwardoriented regime deteriorated while publicly discussing trade liberalization and the
benefits of international competition. Working policy reform through the proper
democratic channels degenerated in real political battles as the region adapted to
democratic rule. Particularly interesting is the political economy of reform approval in a
small Caribbean island, the Dominican Republic.
In this country, reforms were fueled by an Economic Solidarity Pact (ESP) signed
in 1989 by business associations, labor unions and the government. Though the reform
package resulting from the ESP was created domestically, it contained the main policies
recommended in the Washington Consensus'. Economic reforms were of two types:
short-term policies oriented to restore and maintain macroeconomic stability, and
structural or long-term adjustments to create a more market-friendly environment. Short-

term policies were fully applied while structural adjustments were either partially
attempted or completely delayed to avoid political confrontations.

1Williamson (1994) explains that the Washington Consensus offers a description of what is agreed about
the set of measures that are typically called for in the first stage of policy reform. The name suggests that
these core of policies are supported by the multilateral organizations located in Washington, D.C. A
restricted list of the reforms needed during this first stage would include fiscal discipline, trade
liberalization, securing of property rights, openness to foreign direct investment, tax reform, privatization,
exchange rate unification, financial liberalization, deregulation and public expenditure reorientation.

1

A new political upheaval caused by an electoral crisis in 1994 opened the door for a
second turn of economic reforms 2. The ratification of a multiparty agreement, "Pactopor
la Democracia", accelerated the needed political reform allowing a minority party led by
a reformist lawyer, Dr. Leonel Fernandez, to reach power in 19963. President Fernandez
submitted to Congress a comprehensive reform of the tariff and tax system, thus reviving
the interrupted first wave of structural adjustments. This motivated opposing interest
groups to begin lobbying the Assembly in an attempt to influence the decision of
Congress in their favor. Although common in truly democratic nations, this bargaining
process constituted the first complete democratic battle for an economic reform in this
traditionally authoritarian country 4. The subject of study in this dissertation is precisely
the political economy of Dominican economic reforms. Based on a broad case study on
economic adjustments and its antecedents from a political economy standpoint, I develop
two models that reflect the country's framework and are representative of developing

One can observe that in the Dominican Republic policy reforms have been enacted under either a political
or an economic crisis. This correlation between crisis and the viability of reforms is not unknown to
economic theory. Drazen and Grilli (1993) suggest that crises and distortions enable societies to enact
measures that would be impossible to enact in less distortionary circumstances. Alesina and Drazen (1991)
explains the reasons why this phenomenon occurs. Reforms are non neutral and generates redistribution
issues, so they are postponed until some social group is willing to cede ending a "war of attrition" and
bearing the burden of new policies.
3 The core of the multiparty political agreement was a constitutional reform that modify the electoral
system, introducing a second round of voting in electoral tournaments. The Inter-American Development
Bank (1997, p.126) explains how electoral systems are instrumental in shaping political outcomes as degree
of fragmentation of the government, number of parties represented in the legislature and the ability of
minority to obtain political representation. In the Dominican Republic, the change of the electoral system
not only allowed a minority power to obtain political representation but to gained the Presidency, ending a
thirty years history of bipartidism.
a The Dominican Republic has had a democratic system since 1966. However, two elements highlight the
weaknesses of the incipient democracy. First, one president, Dr. Joaquin Balaguer, has been in power for
22 out of 33 possible years. Second, prior to 1996 an elected president never faced a Congress in which his
party represented a Congressional minority. Therefore, previous reform attempts were passed either with
unconditional Congress' support or through decrees that ignored the legislative power. In the new political
scenario generated after the 1996 election ignoring Congress or expecting its unconditional support were
not viable options anymore.
2

2

nations characterized by a history of authoritarianism, weak institutions and presidential
regimes.
The importance of the case study should not be understated. Williamson (1994)
explains that case studies represent "the only possible practical methodology (that
consist) in a careful examination of the specific reform processes in individual
countries" 6. Sturzenegger and Tommasi (1998) explain that three ingredients mold the
political economy of a stylized country. First, there are powerful pressure groups.
Second, these groups can influence public policies. Third, they can influence
governments to redistribute income toward favored groups. While the case study helps us
to identify these powerful pressure groups and the mechanisms they use to alter public
policy in the Dominican Republic, the political economy modeling leads us to establish
their potential behavior in different scenarios. Therefore, it helps to improve the chances
of policy approval as one minimizes the source of conflicts.
The models focus on the demand side of the political market, that is, on the
political game played between two opposing lobbies and its influence in Executive
decisions. I explore two benchmark cases. The first case considers a weak President, who
is not committed to reform and who is lead by the lobbies in his policy submission. The
second case considers a strong President seriously committed to reform, who behaves as
a leader vis a vis the lobbies. It uses a discrete framework in which the President decides
between total liberalization and the actual state of things, represented by protection.

s The type of presidential regime that we refer to is that of democratic constitutions that provided the
Executive Power with exaggerate power. For instance, article 55 of the Dominican Constitution comprises
twenty-seven incises that gives the President extraordinary discretion in his decision-making process. See,
Constituci6n de la Republica Dominicana, 1994.
6

See Williamson (1994), p. 4.

3

While the "strong president case" resembles the Dominican presidential regime, the
"weak president case" captures the role played by powerful lobbies in executive decisionmaking during the import-substitution industrialization era.
Three branches of economic literature provide the cornerstone for this
dissertation. The Public Choice approach uses economic techniques to analyze political
issues. The Endogenous Policy literatureexplains how policymaking is determined
within models of self-driven political actors. The third branch is Contest literature,where
rivals expend effort to affect the probability of winning some particular prize.
Mueller (1993) refers to Public Choice as "the economic study of nonmarket
decision-making or simply the application of economics to political science" 7 . He
considers Arrow (1951) as the turning point in a literature later transformed by Downs
(1957), Buchanan and Tullock (1962) and Olson (1965). Miller (1997) explains how
economists study not only voters, but candidates, bureaucrats, party leaders and others.
The use of economic techniques to analyze the behavior of such political actors gave
birth to a line of interdisciplinary work between economists and political scientists that
has expanded since the mid-sixties.
Some political scientists have been hesitant to give credibility to the new body of
literature fuelled by the fusion of economics and political sciences. Bates (1991) praises
"a form of political analysis that draws upon economic concepts as rational choices and
equilibrium analysis, but avoid applying forms of market analysis to nonmarket
institutions". He disregards the idea of studying the interaction of supply and demand in
market policies. Dunleavy (1987) criticizes what he called FirstPrinciplesof Public

4

Choice as "highly abstract and mathematical with a great deal of unconnected issues to

political theory", but praises InstitutionalPublic Choice as developed by Olson, Downs
and Niskanen among others.
Baldwin (1991) argues that differences between economists and political
scientists arise because "they come to study the subject (political economy) with very
different perspectives. Economists adopt a microeconomic viewpoint with households,
profit-maximizing firms and public officials as the basic building blocks for their model.
In contrast, political scientists, usually view the subject in macropolitical terms with the
state as the basic decision-making unit" 9.
Despite the criticisms, it is impossible to deny the revolution generated by Public
Choice in political sciences. Some economists have speculated about a possible takeover
of political sciences by this innovative approach' 0 . Mueller (1993) compares the
complaints of political scientists to those of economists half a century ago when
mathematics and formal modeling were dominating economic theory. He argues that
Public Choice is here to stay and that in the best of scenarios the future of this economic
branch should be expanded to work not only with political but with other social sciences.
The "economics of politics" expanded during the seventies and eighties under the
label of New Political Economy (NPE). Finlay (1991) explain that most of it "has
postulated a framework of political institutions and behavior that corresponds to that of
advanced industrial countries and even more specifically, to that ruling in contemporary

' See Mueller (1993), p. 395.
8 In Meier (1991), p. 261.
9 See Hillman (1991), p. 268.
10 See Mueller (1993), pp. 510-11.
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United States"". This poses the question of the applicability of NPE models to
developing countries.
Recently, a more restricted field of NPE that focus on the politics of policy
reforms in developing countries has expanded under the name of the new Political
Economy ofPolicy Reform' 2 . In this sub-field, research has taken different roads.
Helpman and Persson (1998) divide the research into three groups: electoral, lobbying
and legislative models. The models presented in this dissertation belong to the second
group as lobbying efforts are determined endogenously by self-interested organizational
groups.
Endogenous lobbying is part of endogenous policy theory (EPT), defined by
Brock, Magee and Young (1989) as a theory that determines a policy through the use of
rational maximizing behavior by participants in the political process1 3 . Pant (1997)
classified endogenous policy models into three groups: models of public interest, models
of self-interest and political market models. The third group is comprised of a
combination of the first two. Furthermore, he divides political market models into three
sub-groups: demand determined models, supply determined models and models of
market approach. Following this classification the models developed in this dissertation
can be identified as demand-determined political market models which rely on a lobbying
contest and Nash equilibrium issues.
The lobbying model constitutes a contest in the sense that "it is a social
interaction where two players (opposing lobbies) expend money or efforts (contributions)

"

See Meier (1991), pp. 13-14.

"2 See Rodrik (1986).
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in hopes of winning a prize (the policy)""4 . It represents an interaction of rent-seeking
from opposing interest groups. Tullock (1980) used game theory and Cournot-Nash
reaction functions to show that the total expenditure in rent-seeking can be greater than,
equal to or less than the rent payoff depending on the number of players and the marginal
cost of influencing the probability of winning. Corcoran and Karels (1980) extended
Tullock's model to a long-run setting with free entry.
Besides rent-seeking, contests have been used to model other economic and social
interactions. Hirschleifer (1989) and Skaperdas (1992) studied the solutions of economic
conflicts. International R&D rivalry for a profitable innovation has been modeled as a
contest by Loury (1979), Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1980) and more recently, Dinopoulos
and Syropoulos (1998). Employment tournaments have been studied by Rosen (1986)
while Dixit (1987) and Nitzan (1994) have devoted their efforts to contests on public
goods.

A key feature of contest modeling is the choice of a contest success function
(CSF) which provides each player's probability of winning a prize as a function of all
players' efforts' 5 . The CSF's choice is frequently described by the logit function, which
defines the probability of winning a prize as the ratio between one player's effort over the
total pool of efforts in the contest. In our setting, the probability of winning the lobbying
contest is given by the probability of Congress approving reforms. I use a logit function
in our second model to define this probability.

1 Frequently, the endogenously determined policy is a tariff, so EPT is known as Endogenous Tariff
Theory. Nelson (1988) presented a complete critical survey of this literature.

14 This definition is in Dasgupta and Nti (1998), p. 587.
15 CSF were axiomatized by Skaperdas (1996).

7

The plan of the dissertation is the following. Chapter II provides a historical background
of the economics of protection in the Dominican Republic since its independence in
1844. Chapter III presents a case study of the political economy of the Dominican reform
process. The first model is presented in chapter IV. It represents a political game where a
weak president, who is not too committed to reform, is led by powerful lobbies in his
policy submission. Lobbies play a reduced-form game within the overall framework
where the president submits the reform to an opposition Congress. In this chapter, we
explain and justify the general assumptions applied to the models. The second political
game develop in chapter V consists in a discrete model where a president, who leads the
lobbies, choose between two policy options: total reform or status-quo. Finally, chapter
VI presents the conclusions and recommendations for future research.

8

CHAPTER II
TARIFFS AND PROTECTION IN THE DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC: A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Since the first half of the twentieth century, most Latin American countries have pursued
an inward-oriented development strategy 6 . Under the intellectual leadership of the
Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), policymakers imposed protection to
promote industrialization in the region. The import-substitution strategy (ISI) proved to
be successful until the mid-sixties

when it began to falter as an efficient economic

strategy. Despite the problems with the ISI, it remained intact in many countries until the
debt crisis of the 1980s18. With international credit cut-off and existing policies causing
severe inflation, a new wave of reforms expanded throughout the Latin American region.
Hence, the story of reforms in the region is strictly tied to ISI policies.
The timing of ISI application in the Dominican Republic approximately coincides
with that of Latin America but for historical reasons the instruments used to promote it,
were radically different. While most countries in the region used tariff and quotas to
protect their economies, a U.S. military intervention forbade the use of such policies in
the Dominican Republic. Governments relied on contracts and special concessions to
provide protection to firms investing in the industrial sector. Direct contracts accelerated
the formation of lobbies as industrialists became aware of the advantages of channeling
their interests in an organized manner. The evolution of anti-reform groups was tied to
the policy of contracts. So any serious attempt to discuss the political economy of

16 See Meier (1995), Cardoso and Helwege (1997), Bruton (1998) and Rodrik (1996).
17 Between 1940 and 1968, Latin America grew at an average rate of 4.5%. See Cardoso (1997), p.98.

Some countries turned to liberalization earlier in the mid-seventies. Basically, Argentina, Uruguay
and
Chile, under military regimes, achieved some economic openness.
18

9

reforms in the Dominican Republic should start by exploring the environment in which
these groups were formed. I devote the rest of the chapter to study the mechanisms used
in the Dominican Republic to substitute imports and impose protection.

Section II.1 describes the origins and evolution of the Dominican external debt
from independence in 1844 to the 1916 military intervention. Section

11.2 discuss the

creation of the tax and tariff system during the occupation. Section 11.3 explains the
mechanisms used to promote protection in the Dominican Republic during the Trujillo's
era (1930-1961). Finally, section 11.4 contains the legal framework of the protective
system removed with the first wave of reforms in 1990.

11.1.

The Early Stages: Independence, Debt and Taxes (1844-1916)

In 1916 the United States performed a military intervention in the Dominican Republic.
The intervention was the final outcome of a debt crisis that affected the country in the late
nineteenth century 9. The origins of the crisis can be traced to the year 1869 when under
the presidency of Buenaventura Baez, the country received a loan from Harmont & Co -a
private firm owned by English bankers- under onerous conditions20 . The length of time
for repayment of principal and interest was twenty-five years.
Few years later, a Holland firm, Westerndorp & Co., made two loans to the young
nation for the amounts of §770,000 and §900,000. The contract signed between the

The Dominican Republic became an independent nation on February 27, 1844. It received from Haiti,
a State completely in bankrupt. During its first twenty-five years of republican life, the National Public
Debt was totally domestic and it was held in commercial paper by local small businesses. See Pena Batlle
19

(1989), pp. 2 6 7 - 9 7 .
The loan contract stated that Harmont & Co., were to raise (420,000 by selling Dominican bonds in
the London Stock Exchange (LSE). From that amount (320,000 were supposed to be given to the
Dominican government and f 100,000 to Mr. Edward H. Harmont, President of the company, in
commissions. Although the Congress cancelled the contract for ample cause (non-fulfillment of terms),
Harmont & Co., got the loan fraudulently listed in the LSE. At the end, the Dominican government only
20
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Dominican government and the company included a clause that established "the creation
of a General Receivership of Custom Collections managed by Westemdorp & Co. or
whomever represents them, in charge of all income generated through import and export

taxes in Dominican ports" 2 . The clause was valid through the duration of the loan.
In 1897, a New Jersey Company, The San Domingo Improvement acquired
Westemdorp's interests in the Dominican Republic22 . Following the stipulation that
created the Receivership, Dominican Customs fell under American private administration
at the beginning of the XX century. In 1907, a bilateral agreement with the United States
known as the Dominican-American Convention was signed, establishing the official
transfer of Dominican Customs to American authorities. The Convention prohibited the
Dominican Republic from incurring additional debt without prior American approval2 3 .
An alleged violation of this prohibition was the cause of a military intervention in 19162.
The intervention lasted eight years (1916-1924). At the beginning, trade taxes
were collected using a new tariff law approved in the post-convention years . After
several studies, the United States administration passed a new tariff legislation in 1919.
Tariff policy in the Dominican Republic became a prerogative of the government of the

received U$ 190,000 and was asked to pay back nearly U$ 4,000,000. A complete story on the Harmont

loan appears in Knight (1928), pp. 14-18.

Better known as "Le Regie", this receivership was basically the Customhouse of a country that at the
time collected 96% of tax revenues through trade taxes. See Ortiz (1955), pp. 6-7.
22 Before selling its rights in 1897, Westerndorp and Co. bought must of Harmont's bonds on Dominican
debt. Therefore, by acquiring Westerndorp's interest in the Dominican Republic, the San Domingo
Improvement owned must of the external debt of the country. Few bonds were in hands of Belgium,
French and English investors. See Knight (1928), p. 1 8 .
23 See article 3 of the Convention in Welles (1966), p. 6 5 2
.
24 Goldwert (1962) argues that what happens in the Dominican Republic was a total military
intervention
since "the whole apparatus of the government was taken over by military administration... The Dominican
Congress was suspended and the power of legislation by decree was vested to the military government".
25 The Law exactly passed on January 1, 1910. See Knight (1928),
p. 4 3 .
21
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United States, not only throughout the intervention but until mid-century 6 . The first
Dominican tariff law was not passed until 1947 and it was modified six years later by

Law 3489. None of the legislation marked substantial difference with the original 1919
Tariff Law. The first significant changes came with the 1970 tariff legislation and
disappeared with the economic reforms of the early nineties.
Besides changes in external taxation, the Americans tried to modify the domestic
tax structure by improving its administration and creating new taxes. By 1919, the
military regime had tripled tax collections without the addition of significant taxes 27.
New revenue sources were created through four important Laws: a) The 1918 Internal
Revenue Law; b) The 1919 New Property Tax on Land : c) The 1918 PatentLaw ; and d)

the creation in 1920 of The NationalLottery. Tax collections were affected by these
innovations in a different way. While National Lottery became the second largest source
of revenue behind customhouses, receipts obtained from the property tax decreased every
year during the 1920s (see Figure II.1).
Property Tax Collections
(millions of RD$)
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0

Figure 11.1

Source: Central Bank of the Dominican Republic.

Remember the famous clause in the old Westemdorp contract allowing intervention of Customs until
complete fulfillment of obligations.
21 Ibid., p.73.
26
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Despite the restructuring of the domestic tax system, total tax revenue was still highly
dependent on trade taxes 28 . This meant the 1919 tariff legislation was the most important

fiscal measure approved during the intervention. The creation of this Law and its relation
with the method used in the Dominican Republic to develop industrial protection is the
subject of our next sub-section.

11.2.

The 1919 Tariff Legislation and the Origins of the Protective System

The fiscal reform undertaken by the United States military regime consisted of two types
of general measures: to modernize the old fiscal administrative structure 29, and to create
new taxes or eliminate existing ones. While the former required a huge organizational
effort provided by the military, the later needed technical help. To get it, the military
hired in 1918 an economic advisor from Yale University, Fred R. Fairchild. In his report,
Fairchild proposed a complete reform of the 1910 Tariff Law to promote "freer trade,
adequate revenue, economic development and with lower prices, an improvement in the
welfare of consumers"3 0 . At the end of 1919, a new tariff bill was approved.
The 1919 tariff legislation lowered rates an average 38% and placed 245
American industrial products on a free list3 1 . Though it contributed to the opening of the
country to trade, it did so at a very high cost since Dominican exports did not received a
similar treatment in the United States32 . Despite a removal attempt by the first postintervention government headed by Horacio Vasquez, the new legislation survived until
The traditional theory of Public Finance suggests that at early stages of development countries rely on
trade taxes as the main source of tax collections. The reason is due not only to administrative issues but
also to the fact that the business base in the country is very small. See Musgrave (1973), pp. 121-132.
29 A memorandum sent to the U.S. Senate Committee by the U.S. Military Government
in 1921 states that
"the aim of the military government has been to organized the financial administration of the country on an
72
honest and efficient basis, (and) to establish an equitable tax system" as cited by Calder (1984), p. .
30 Ibid., p.75.
28

31 See Moya Pons, Frank (1992).
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the 1940s under the protection of a new Dominican-American Convention which

stipulated that the Dominican government could not change the 1919 tariff legislation
without prior authorization3.
Given this obstacle, President Vasquez promulgated Law 190 that imposed taxes
over the commercialization of most imported goods 34 . When Dictator Trujillo took power
in 1930, he allowed the General Receivership to collect receipts from the new tax
imposed by Vasquez. Five years later and once consolidated in power, Trujillo
promulgated Law 854, which created an ad-valorem tax of 50% over the consumption of
imported goods. In doing so, the Dictator was planning for the future since he already had
started negotiations with the United States to abolish the 1924 Dominican-American
Convention3 5 . The Trujillo-Hull (T-H) Agreement signed on September 24, 1940
terminated the Convention and returned the General Custom Receivership to the
Dominican government.
In spite of the return of the Customhouse to Dominicans, a huge proportion of
collections was still used to repay the debt. In 1947, after a negotiation process, Trujillo
paid the remnants of the external debt. Up to this point it was impossible for the
Dominican government to protect its economy through tariff policy. Given the constraints
posed by the foreign debt and the inability of having a national tariff policy, Trujillo
opted for "the modality of contracts" to provide protection and promote industrialization

32 The United States did not provide reciprocity to Dominican exports in order to protect American colonial

and Cuban interests. See Mejia (1976), p. 2 8 8 and Calder (1984) pp. 7 5- 7 7 . The impact of the new tariff
over the incipient industrial sector in the Dominican Republic is explained in Moya Pons (1992), pp.6 - 1 0 .
3 The new Convention was signed in 1924. See Vega (1990).
3 According to Moya Pons (1992) this new tax increased protection for almost the total Dominican

industry by 85%.
3

The details of the negotiations are exposed in Rodriguez Demorizi (1956), pp. 15 - 19 .
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in the country . Contracts created an implicit association between the government and an
incipient industry, which industrials tried to maintain with the advent of democracy.
When Trujillo decided to implement its contract policy, the industrial sector in the
Dominican Republic was minimal. By 1939 a few industries were classified in three
groups3 7 : a) big industries that use mechanic force in their production process; b) disperse
industries that provide inputs to individuals who work in their respective houses; and c)
domestic or family industries that resembled a microenterprise of today's informal sector.
By choosing the big companies of Santo Domingo as his partners for the
industrial development of the country, Trujillo planted the roots of the future anti-reform
lobby, which eventually played a key role in blocking every policy that intended to
reduce protection. In the next sub-section we study the instruments used by Trujillo to
provide protection and to strengthen ties with the industrial sector.

11.3.

Contracts, Exemptions and ISI Policy: The First Anti-Reform Group

The T-H Agreement and the cancellation of the external debt allowed the Dominican
Republic to recuperate its ability to dictate fiscal policy. Two alternative protective
policies became possible: "special concessions and contracts" to justify tax exemptions
and incentives, or a new protective tariff and the imposition of import licenses and
prohibitions. During Trujillo's rule, special contracts and concessions outweighed tariff
38

policy as the preferred means of protection.

One must clarify that the intent of the Dictator was never to achieve economic development for the
country through industrialization, but rather to reach his own economic goals. Wiarda (1968) explains how
at the end of the dictatorship Trujillo and his family owned 80% of the volume of business in Santo
Domingo.
36

37

Moya Pons (1992), p. 17 .

The right to assign and approve contracts and concessions was given to Congress by article 90 of the
1942 constitution. Ibid., p.24.

38
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The first contract, considered a model for future contracts, contained the classical
privileges assigned to ISI firms throughout Latin America 39: domestic tax exemptions
and zero tariffs for the import of intermediate goods used in the production process. With
a high tariff on imported final goods and low or zero tariffs on inputs, the effective rate of
protection (ERP) for the Dominican Republic was undoubtedly very high.
Trujillo provided special concessions to private firms, many of which were either
partially or totally owned by himself or members of his family, which created many
State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) or mixed-capital firms. With his disappearance, the
Dominican State unexpectedly inherited a stock of public enterprises that produced a
variety of private goods: from cement to flour to paint to textiles40 .
When Trujillo initiated his program to promote industrialization through contracts
and concessions, agriculture was the most dynamic sector in the economy. In 1951 there
was a 6% gap between the contributions of agriculture and industry to total GDP. The
gap increased during the rest of the decade getting close to 10% in 1960. Moreover,
industrialization seemed to be following the fluctuations in agriculture (see Figure 11.2).
Two arguments can be used to explain this trend: first, incentives and privileges
conceded to agriculture were similar to those received by industry; and second,
agriculture was the "leader" sector influencing "the follower", industry. The former
argument was valid particularly in sugar production where Trujillo owned most of the
cane mills in the country. Sugar was the main Dominican export at the time. The later
argument posed market constraints as the main restriction for industrial development in a

9 It was given to Textilera Dominicana C por A., a textile industry. Ibid., pp. 27-28.
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small country. Therefore, a boom in agricultural exports increases aggregate demand for
manufactures, thus increasing the profitability of industrial investment.
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Source: Central Bank of the Dominican Republic.

At the end of the dictatorship in 1961, the nation was affected by widespread political
turmoil. People cried for confiscation of Trujillo's properties. Afraid of losing their firms,
industrialists became conscious of the need to organize industrial associations to defend
the privileges earned during the Trujillo Era. Everything was happening within a stagnant
economy. An economic embargo by the Organization of American States (OAS) had
been in effect since 1958. The country was on a verge of a balance of payment crisis.
Although its current account was still in surplus, international net reserves were depleted.
Furthermore, the rate of growth of the economy was negative and there was no sign of
recovery (see table II.1).
40 This unexpected inheritance was gathered in CORDE, the abbreviation for Corporation of State-Owned
Enterprises. The privatization of CORDE was later on, one of the most controversial issues of reform in the
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Year

TABLE 11.1
Dominican Republic
Selected Economic Indicators
-1955-1961-Millions of U$Current Account GDP Growth Rate Net International
Balance

1955
1956
1957

(6.2)
(9.2)

1958
1959
1960
1961

(13.7)

Reserves

6.36%
9.7%
6.2%

37.5
39.8
48.0

78.4

5.4%
1.9%
0.5%

47.3
41.7
29.6

33.0

-1.5%

3.8

18.1
(6.1)

Source: Central Bank of the Dominican Republic, Quarterly Bulletin, various issues.

Before overcoming the economic crisis, industrialists made the first serious attempt of
organization. In February 1962, they founded the IndustrialAssociation of the Dominican
Republic (AIRD) 4 1. The AIRD's lobbying efforts rapidly paid off with the creation of the
IndustrialDevelopment Corporation(CFI) and the approval of Law 4 of Industrial

Incentives42. Law 4 represented the culmination of a series of efforts by industrialists to
legalize the old system of contracts and special concessions. However, an article of the
new legislation directly affected the interests of industrialists. It stated that there would be
no exemptions for the imported input goods that were domestically produced.
In the mid-1960s, the AIRD started to lobby for new legislation. Law 299 of
Industrial Protection was finally approved in 1968. It constituted the most complete and
efficient instrument the Dominican Republic ever had for protection. The law remained

mid-1990s.

41 The association was founded "as an instrument to defend the interest of its associates and protect the
industry against those who wanted to eliminate fiscal protection". See Moya Pons (1992), p.81.
42 The CFI was founded during the "Consejo de Estado" which was the temporary
government in charge of
organizing the first democratic election at the end of the dictatorship. Law 4 was approved during
"Triunvirato" a de facto government that gained power precisely after a coup to the elected government
from the just mentioned elections.
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in force until the economic reforms of the early nineties. Along with the approval of a
new tariff legislation in 1970, Law 299 represented the core of the legal framework for
protection during the pre-reform stage.

I1.4.1 The Legal Framework of Protection at the Pre-Reform Stage (1968-1989)
Incentive policies applied after the American intervention took form in several laws,
which were eventually consolidated into two instruments. The Law 299 of Industrial
Incentives and Protection, and Law 170 or the "new 1970 custom tariff'.

Law 299 represented the legal framework that gathered all facilities, concessions
and exemptions provided by Trujillo through his contract policy. It was promulgated on
April 23, 1968 according to the government "to promote the most rapid and effective
industrial promotion of the country's economy with the purpose of obtaining permanent
sources of employment and income for our population"4 3 . The truth is that it was the

result of a long process of political bargaining won by the old industrialists under the
umbrella of the AIRD 44.
The industrial incentive legislation established a classification of industries
according to type of tax exemption. Table

11.2 shows

the industrial classification with its

respective exemptions. Firms were classified in categories A, B and C. The last two
groups represented the ISI industries with one single difference: Firms in section B
included those firms that produced goods not available through domestic production

43 Vedovato (1985), p. 116.
44 Another important group that played a key role in the approval of Law 299 was "The Consejo Nacional
de Hombres de Empresa" (National Council of Businessmen) or CNHE founded in 1962. For details on the
role played by these lobby groups regarding the approval of Law 299 see Moya Pons (1992), pp. 13 7 -6 4 .
The analysis is very interesting from the political economy standpoint since it shows how the AIRD used
its lobbying power to delayed several Incentive Laws in Congress until it had the opportunity for "the right
one".
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while firms in section C included new firms in markets were though there was some

domestic production, it existed uninstalled capacity 45 . The third classification, category
A, included firms that invested in Free-Trade Industrial Zones. These firms produced for
the external market, so offering exemptions here constituted a strategy of export
promotion. Law 299 suffered from a repeated error in the Dominican economic
legislation: the pursuit of two opposite objectives with a single instrument 46.
TABLE 11.2

Law 299 of 1968
-Industrial Classification
and Tax Exem tions-

Categories

A

Machinery and
Equipment

Combustion

Intermediate

Income

Patent

(Fuel

Goods

Tax

Tax

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

90%
90%

95%
95%

50%
50%

B
B

Source: Gonzalez Cano, Hugo and G6mez Sabaini, J (1992).

Although Law 299 was the most important legislation for protection in the history of the
Dominican Republic, it was not the only one. Other legal instruments generated
protection in different sectors such as tourism, agricultural industry and non-traditional
exports47.
Table

11.3 compares

the contribution of different sectors to the overall economy

after the promulgation of Law 299. With the exemption of 1975 and 1976, the
contribution of industrial output to total GDP was always below 20%48. Furthermore,

as Vedovato (1985), p. 17 .
46 Dauhajre (1994),
p. 8 .
47 Law 153 of Tourism Development; Law 409 for the Development of Agroindustrial Production; Law 69
of Export Promotion.
48 In the mid-seventies there was a boom in the international price of sugar generating a considerable
increase of export receipts. Ceara Hatton (1990) argues that this caused an increase in aggregate demand
and urban migration. To target that market niche, new industries that produced consumption goods were
established.
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industry never displaced agriculture as the most dynamic sector of the economy as it did

in most Latin American countries that followed the import-substituting strategy.
Eventually the agricultural sector was supplanted as the main engine of the Dominican
economy by a service sector lead by free-trade zones and tourism.
TABLE 11.3
Dominican Republic
Share of GDP per Economic Sector
-1968-1992-

Years Agriculture Mines
1968
23.14%
1.56%
1969
24.24%
1.60%
1970
23.24%
1.53%
1971
22.24%
1.42%
1972
20.58%
2.59%
1973
22.23%
3.47%
1974
22.15%
2.67%
1975
21.47%
3.00%
1976
19.05%
3.53%
1977
20.07%
3.14%
1978
18.72%
2.49%
1979
18.67%
4.02%
5.30%
1980
20.15%
1981
18.57%
3.72%
1982
17.73%
2.59%
1983
17.22%
2.66%
18.50%
2.35%
1984
1985
17.37%
4.47%
1986
16.41%
3.85%
18.71%
5.34%
1987
4.94%
1988
18.31%
4.71%
17.83%
1989
4.10%
1990
17.20%
1991
17.80%
3.97%

Industry Construction Commerce
16.26%
4.88%
16.31%
17.33%
4.57%
15.55%
18.54%
4.89%
15.99%
18.37%
6.04%
16.38%
17.48%
6.44%
16.71%
17.01%
6.56%
16.40%
18.62%
6.77%
17.27%
20.90%
6.90%
16.28%
20.62%
6.48%
17.08%
6.67%
17.16%
18.98%
18.58%
7.37%
15.48%
16.89%
7.62%
15.66%
15.31%
7.23%
15.80%
7.39%
16.48%
15.59%
6.72%
16.95%
18.27%
17.71%
7.76%
16.82%
17.21%
8.51%
16.49%
16.24%
17.44%
6.36%
17.36%
6.97%
15.75%
15.71%
14.67%
9.07%
9.86%
13.97%
13.73%
14.27%
9.54%
13.84%
13.70%
8.00%
13.50%
7.10%
13.74%
13.50%

J

Finance Government
9.26%
11.73%
8.90%
10.98%
8.56%
10.24%
8.53%
10.03%
9.04%
8.82%
8.98%
7.95%
8.50%
7.23%
8.58%
6.35%
10.16%
6.47%
11.04%
5.96%
11.78%
6.89%
8.44%
11.77%
11.97%
8.32%
13.32%
8.37%
12.92%
8.33%
8.17%
12.64%
7.84%
11.99%
11.07%
10.47%
10.61%
10.73%
10.02%
10.62%
10.60%
9.73%
16.67%
9.59%
8.80%
17.50%
17.74%
8.76%

Source: Central Bank of the Dominican Republic, Quarterly Bulletin, various issues.

The legal framework of Dominican "protectionism" was completed by the 1970 tariff
legislation. Law 170 was the creation of a technical group named by President Balaguer
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in 1967". It recommended correcting two major problems: the classification system of
imported merchandise, obsolete to the extreme that several goods invented after 1919
were not even classified; and the complicated import tax legislation that consisted not
only of tariffs, but of special taxes that made administration barely possible.
The tariff reform was expected to be completed in three gradual stages:
1)

The adoption of "The Brussels Nomenclature" in order to eliminate the administrative
disorder caused by the hole in the classification process.

2) The consolidation in a single tariff of the taxes created by the 1953 Law and any
additional special legislation that affects imports.
3) The revision and reduction of the level of tariffs.
Law 170 barely made it to the second stage. Though the system became better organized
with the adoption of the new nomenclature, the reduction in protection was negligible.
An important reduction in tariff rates was not achieved until the 1990 tariff amendment,
one of the reforms taken during the first wave of structural changes of the early nineties.
The first section of the upcoming chapter deals precisely with the economic and political
context of the first wave of reforms.

The group worked under the orders of Mario Vela B., a custom's expert, who was a consultant for the
United Nations. The opinions, conclusions and recommendations of the group were gathered in
Secretariado Tecnico de la Presidencia (1970).
49
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CHAPTER III
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF STRUCTURAL
ADJUSTMENTS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

111.1

The First Wave of Reforms (1990-1993)

111.1.1

The Macro Context of Reforms: Economic Policy in the Mid-Eighties

With minimal changes, Laws 299 and 170 constituted the pillars of protectionism during
the 1970-1990 period. Any serious attempt at reform should start with the removal of the
legal framework provided by these laws, which entailed confronting the powerful interest
groups that defended this legislation. The first chance to do so came in the early eighties
when the debt crisis illuminated the inefficiency of protectionism. The system fell under
scrutiny while the economy entered a deep recession. In 1983, the government of Dr.
Salvador Jorge Blanco signed a stand-by agreement with the IMF5 0 . By 1985, the
depreciation of the peso stopped and inflation was under control. Though real output was
falling at a rate of 2.12%, adjustments were made to the economic structure. However,
the government refused to negotiate with the World Bank on any structural reform,
postponing needed changes indefinitely.
In 1986, a new government lead by Dr. Joaquin Balaguer applied an expansionary
economic policy that consisted of an ambitious program of public works financed with
monetary expansions. Investment in the construction sector grew at an average annual
rate of 64.79% during Balaguer's administration. By 1987, the economy had an
impressive recovery and real GDP was growing at a rate of 10.12% (see Table

111.1).

50 An outcome of this agreement was the creation of a 6 % value-added tax known as Impuesto sobre la

Transferenciade Bienes Industrializados(ITBIS).
5 Ceara Hatton (1990) called it a program of disordered reactivation.
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The rapid expansion of public investment created an unmanageable government deficit
that jeopardized economic stability. To finance it, money supply more than tripled rising
from RD$ 2503.3 million in 1986 to RD$ 8304.8 million in 1990. The monetary
expansion not only generated inflation, but it also depreciated the exchange rate by
almost 300%. At the end of the decade, the economy completely collapsed, output
decreased by 6% and inflation reached a peak of 80 %.
TABLE 111.1
Dominican Republic
Selected Economic Indicators
1986-1990
-Millions of RD$-

Years

Spending in
Construction

1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990

888.6
1100.04
1771.0
2786.0
4043.8
5189.3

Real GDP

M1

Official
Exchange Rate

Inflation
Rate

1639.1
2503.3
3102.6
4694.6
5911.7
8304.8

3.12
2.91
3.84
6.15
6.97
11.13

30.85
4.40
22.67
55.8
34.59
79.92

(In percent)
(2.12)

J

3.52
10.12
2.16
4.40

(5.45)
Source: Central Bank of the Dominican Republic, Quarterly Bulletin, various issues.

In addition, external conditions were completely unfavorable. The gulf war caused a
rationing of fuel causing long queues at gas stations. The disruption in transportation
increased the prices of agricultural goods. The crisis reached a climax in August of 1990
when a general strike left 12 people killed and more than one hundred injured. The
uncertainty caused by the crisis obliged opposing interest groups seek a solution in a
National agreement known as the Economic Solidarity Pact.

111.1.2

Economic Solidarity Pact: The Politics of the First Reforms

The economic, social and political situation in the Dominican Republic was so critical
that at the national level there was a consensus that something must be done. Following
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guidelines of the hierarchy of the Catholic Church , PUCMM, a Catholic university
started a series of meetings with representative sectors of society to develop a strategy to
solve the crisis5 2 . The encounters yielded a tripartite dialog between business
associations, labor unions and the government.

On August 16, 1990, Dr. Joaquin Balaguer gained power for a second consecutive
period53 . Quickly the government revived the tripartite dialog and proposed the signature
of The Economic Solidarity Pact (ESP), a concerted agreement oriented to solve the debt
crisis. Curiously, Dr. Balaguer, who was the architect of Law 299 of Industrial
Protection, becomes the artisan of the first wave of Dominican reforms, among them, the
removal of that legislation (Law 299). His reform impetus was an intelligent way of
solving a political crisis and a way to re-affirm his powers.
The ESP contained the first group of reforms oriented to liberalize and deregulate
many sectors of the Dominican economy. The pact included two types of policies:
structural or long-term changes such as tariff, tax, labor, monetary and financial reforms

among others; and short-term stabilization policies aimed at reducing inflation, correcting
the balance of payments problems and promoting economic growth. Figure

111.1

shows

the result of the short-run stabilization programs over the relevant variables.

52 Its representative Monsieur Agripino Nunez Collado (1997) explained the role of the Catholic
Church in

negotiations toward a crisis solution.
5 His reelection in a controversial electoral tournament exacerbated the political crisis. The opposition
claimed for his resignation under the allegation of an electoral fraud. Brea et al (1995) did a survey where
68% of Dominicans said to believe that there was a fraud in the 1990 elections ( p.225).
5 A President not committed to reform in a presidential regime is a guarantee for failure. As soon as the
economic crisis was solved, Dr. Balaguer return to the old practice of postponing necessary structural
changes. As Vega (1996) put it "the economic reform imposed by "the Washington Consensus" through the
World Bank, The IMF and the Inter American Development Bank in Latin America, collides in the
Dominican Republic with a political system that does not believe in it"(p.157).
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One can observe the dramatic decrease in the inflation rate and the recovery of GDP after
1990. Economic stability was achieved and maintained during the last nine years. While
the short-term program proved to be successful, long-term structural changes were never
completely realized. Among the long-term reforms undertaken, two deserve further
explanation: the 1990 and 1992 tariff and tax reforms. These two instruments became the
center of the aborted second wave of reforms in 1996. To be able to grasp the political
economy issues that prevented a second wave of reforms, we need to evaluate the core of
the previous tax and tariff programs and the politics behind them.
111.1.3. Structural Changes: The 1990 Tariff Reform and the 1992 Tax Reform
So far we have explored the overall crisis experienced by the Dominican Republic during
the pre-reform stage and the short run policies used to overcome the crisis. Now we turn
to the role played by the different political actors to ratify the ESP for structural reforms.
The consensus was reached because no interest group had the power to impose

conditions. While the government was trying to consolidate its fragile political power and
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reduce popular resentment, business associations and labor unions were facing possible
division.
Business associations suffered an important partition. Industrialists and importsubstituting producers remained represented by the old Consejo Nacional de Hombres de
Empresas (CNHE) while importers of final goods and members of the commercial sector
gathered in Union Nacionalde Empresarios(UNE)55. The UNE became a pro-reform
lobby that opposed the traditional anti-reform interest group of the AIRD, now
represented by the CNHE. Workers, on the other side, were dispersed in different labor
unions, some of which aligned with a particular party. The fragmentation of labor
interests were even greater than that of businessmen, evidenced by its waning
bargaining56
President Balaguer did not want to incur in a new political battle in Congress for a
reform that he did not support. However, the tariff reform was non-negotiable. The
reopening of international credit depended on the acceptance of a new IMF agreement
which will impose a reduction in tariffs as a condition for new capital inflows. Executive
decree 339-90 imposed the tariff reform in September 199057. Three years later, in
August 1993, and with slight modifications, the new tariff was approved by Congress.

The English names for the business associations would be National Council of Enterprise Men (CNHE)
and National Union of Entrepreneurs (UNE).
56 During the tripartite dialogue, while the government and businesses
were represented by single
5

delegations, workers' interests were channeled through at least six different unions.
57 We already argued that the constitution of the Dominican Republic gives the President extraordinary
powers for discretion. For instances incise 13 of article 55 of the Dominican Constitution establish vaguely
that the President can "rule whatever he consider convenient to the Custom service". See Constitution of
the Dominican Republic, 1994.
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The new tariff regime58 pointed toward: a) simplification of tax administration; b) a
reduction of effective protection; and c) an increase in economic efficiency. The

simplification of the administrative system was achieved through the consolidation of
more than twenty-five import tax laws into a single legal instrument. Exemptions,
concessions and special treatments provided by other laws were also eliminated 59. The
improvement in tax administration and the restructuring of the system used to value
imports yielded an unexpected result: at the beginning of the reform collections increased
despite the tariff reduction 6 0. The new system reduced tariffs gradually and consolidated
import rights across eight different levels from 3% to 35%. The maximum amount a tariff
was reduced was from 200% to 35%, reducing protection and increasing the efficiency of
the economy61.

Figure

111.2 shows

the proportion of tax revenue collected through different types

of taxes in the Dominican Republic, before and after the tariff reform. Although the share
of trade taxes over total tax revenue was reduced after the reform, the Dominican tax
system is still highly dependent on trade taxes. In fact, no country in Latin America
shows a similar or a higher level of dependence. The debate to "reform the reform",
which reached a climax with the submission of the second wave of reforms to Congress,
started with this issue.
Table A.III.1 in the appendix shows the main changes to the old tariff system after the reform.
5 Few exemptions were kept like those that refers to imports realized by the government, international
organizations and diplomacy.
60 The most important change that affected valuation of imports was
the use of a market exchange rate
instead of the official system of preferential rates.
61 The real reduction of effective protection, if any, has been a subject of debate in the Dominican Republic.
While The rate of effective protection before the reform was 162.5% in average (Morales, 1985),
estimations after the reform range from 94% to 131% (Dauhajre and Escuder, 1996) to an average of 46%
(Isa Contreras, 1994). The World Bank (1995) estimated an average effective protection of 152% in 1993.
58
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Figure III.2(a)

Figure 111.2(b)
Dominican Republic
Average Share on Tax Revenue
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One can see that the reduction in the share of trade tax collections over total tax revenue
was absorbed by the receipts of taxes on goods and services (G&S). This improvement
was the result of the new tax code, Law 11-92 of April 1992. The tax bill passed in a
Congress now marked with a different political and economic perspective than the one
faced by its predecessor reform. The success of the policies applied through the ESP has
already generated economic stability, as evidenced by the recovery of output from its

1990 debacle. The code did not represent a controversial item for political debate.
However, it became an important point of contention during the second wave of reforms.
The tax reform targeted four groups of taxes 62 : a) the income tax -for individuals
and businesses- which comes from the Trujillo Era and was modified in 1962 by Law
5911; b) the value-added tax, known in the Dominican Republic as ITBIS and introduced
with the IMF agreement of 1983; c) the selective tax on particular goods like alcohol,

Vega (December, 1995) criticized the World Bank study on the grounds that it wrongfully computed the
average import tariffs for intermediate goods.
62 The main modifications of Law 11-92 are summarized
in table A.III.2 in the appendix.
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tobacco or some luxuries created through different laws since the beginning of the

dictatorship; and d) "El recargo cambiario", an exchange rate commission of 20%,
charged by the Central Bank to imports.
The tax reform aimed to increase the tax ratio and to improve the tax
administration. The marginal tax rate for individual income tax was gradually reduced

from 70% to 25%. For businesses, the marginal tax rate on benefits decreased from 49%
to the same level as the personal tax (25%). The ITBIS was raised to 8% and its tax base
was widened to prevent a potential reduction of income tax receipts. Figure

111.3

shows

how the tax ratio of the Dominican Republic evolved before and after the reform.

Dom inican Republic
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Source: Central Bank of the Dominican Republic, Quarterly Bulletin, various issues.

Though the reform increased the tax ratio, it was just enough to return to its 1983 level.
Furthermore, it is still well below the Latin American average of 20%. This posed a
challenge for the tariff reform. A reduction in custom duties will reduce the tax ratio of a
country whose income is highly dependent on external taxes. Therefore, to avoid
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unwanted deficits that can threaten economic stability, a complementary tax reform is
mandatory with increasing liberalization. The controversial second wave of reform
attempted precisely to achieve the goal of preserving stability while in the process of
reform. In the next section we turn to the political economy of the Dominican reform
process of 1996.

111.2.

Toward a Second Wave of Reforms (1993-1996)

Despite the recovery of the Dominican economy after the first wave of reforms,
economic stability was far from permanent. The delay in structural adjustments kept the
old institutional framework intact, which allowed the relaxation of short-term policies. In
1993, the official party was on the verge of initiating a political campaign where its
leader, Dr. Joaquin Balaguer was a presidential candidate for a third consecutive term.
The economy was about to encounter a temporary boom of the political cycle.
Government spending was increased while funds destined for debt repayments were
deviated to finance political goals. The public deficit for the central government reached

4.5% of GDP in 1994, putting pressure on the level of prices and the exchange rate. A
dependent Central Bank monetized the deficit and international reserves were depleted to
avoid further depreciation.
The incipient economic crisis was exacerbated by two elements: 1) a corruption
scandal in Customhouses, which lead to the arrest of several public officials. Some of
them made serious accusations against high ranking members of the government; 2) a
new political crisis was in gestation. Junta Central Electoral (JCE, the Electoral Board)
was unable to declare a winner in the 1994 election. The main opposition party, Partido
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RevolucionarioDominicano(PRD) alleged fraud from the official PartidoReformista
Social Cristiano(PRSC) 63.
In August, a new multiparty agreement, Pacto Nacionalpor la Democracia

(National Pact for Democracy) was signed not only by PRD and PRSC, but by a third
political force, Partido de la Liberaci6n Dominicana (PLD)64. The new pact centered
around a constitutional reform that proved to be fundamental for the future political
battles that developed with the second wave of reforms in 1996. Table

111.2 presents the

main constitutional changes agreed to in the pact.
TABLE 111.2
Dominican Republic
Important Issues from
The 1994 Constitutional Reform
1.

The prohibition of Presidential reelection.

2. The separation of Presidential and Congressional election.
3.

The introduction of financial support to political campaigns
through the budget.

4. The inclusion of a second round in Presidential electoral
tournaments.
5. The call for a new election in 1996.
Source: Dominican Republic Constitution, 1994.

Regardless of the abrupt way in which it was approved, the content of this reform had
been discussed for years in the Dominican Republic6 5 . Its connection with the second turn

The English translation of parties' names would be Dominican Revolutionary Party and Reformist
Social-Christian Party.
64 PLD stand for Dominican Liberation
Party.
65 Such political reform was the aim of civil society for years. Garcia Michel
(1997, No.54) explains the
importance of the constitutional changes of the 1994 political reform and the bargaining process behind it.
63
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of reforms is that it changed the face of the traditional political spectrum. By calling for a
new election in 1996, prohibiting presidential reelection and establishing a second round
of voting should a first round majority not be obtained, the constitutional reform allowed
a minority party, PLD, to reach the presidency. The elected candidate, a reformist lawyer,
Dr. Leonel Fernandez took power on August 16, 19966.
The new political panorama included a reformist President constrained by the new
constitution to a non-renewable four year period, who will rule the country with a
Congress dominated by the opposition. If submitted, the new set of reforms would have
to pass the obstacle of an opposition Congress. The implications of this system were
unknown for a country, which had passed through either dictatorial governments or
democratic regimes where a single party controlled both the executive and legislative
power.
The first test of relations between President Fernandez and Congress came with
the 1997 budget. He submitted the budget on December 21, 1996 and with it the main
components of the second wave of reforms: new tariff reductions and a tax amendment.
The President explained that the bill represented an attempt to change the actual
economic model to a more market and trade oriented framework 67. The political economy
behind the discussion of the budget bill is explained in the rest of the chapter. I start

Vega (1996) describes how the authoritarian tradition in the Dominican Republic subordinated the political
reform to the economic one. See pp.94-98.
66 Dr. Jose Francisco Pena G6mez, presidential candidate of PRD, was
the winner of the first round of the
election followed by Fernandez. The later received the support of PRSC and its candidate in the second
turn of voting.
67 Though Fernandez explained that the tax amendment was a necessary
measure to compensate the
revenue lost caused by the tariff reduction, the opposition alleged he was seeking for greater income for
the upcoming congressional election.
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describing the proposed reforms and explaining the mechanism for budget approval in the
Dominican Republic.

111.3.

The Political Economy of the Second Wave of Reforms

111.3.1

Government Budget and Economic Reforms

To understand the setting in which economic reforms were discussed, we must describe
the mechanism of fiscal decisions and budget approval in the Dominican Republic. The
1969 Budget Law established that the President should submit the budget to Congress at
the beginning of the second legislative section in August of every year. Congress can
either accept or reject the proposal. If rejected, the previous year's budget remains in
place (Table III.3). The law also allows the Assembly to modify the project and it permits
the president to veto any modification.
TABLE 111.3
Dominican Republic
About the Budget Process
About the Budget Process
Dominican Republic

Latin
America*

=

Constitutional Constraints on Fiscal
Deficits.
Macroeconomic Program

[

Constitution stipulates a
"proper" financing of the deficit.
Not important.

16/20

Congress approves each
operation.
Equal to other ministers.

8/20

On government's initiative with

16/20

5/20

Constraints.

-

Debt Ceiling Constraints.

-

Authority of the Finance Minister in
the Drafting Stage.
Revisions to the Budget in the
Implementation Process
Relationship of Government and
Congress in the Approval Stage.

-

-

1/20

congressional approval.
-

If Congress rejects the budget,
8/20
previous year's budget is
enacted.
Source: Inter-American Development Bank: Latin America after a Decade of Reforms:
Economic and Social Progress Report, 1997.
*the fraction indicates how many out of 20 Latin countries follow similar guides in their
process of budget approval.
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As in most Latin American countries, if implemented, the budget can only be revised by
the government with Congress' approval. Table

111.4 compares

the Dominican

Legislative and Executive powers with the rest of Latin America. The Legislative Power
is divided into two chambers: the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. In December
1996, 29 out of 30 seats at the higher house were dominated by the opposition. The
official party, PLD, had 13 seats in the Chamber of Deputies equivalent to only 10.8% of
available seats. Though the Executive Power exhibit a presidential regime -as most Latin
countries do- President Fernandez faced an impressive minority in Congress when his
reforms were submitted.
TABLE 111.4
Dominican Republic
Fiscal Decisions and Democracy
-A Comparison with Latin AmericaDominican Republic

Latin America

1. LEGISLATIVE POWER
"

"

Legislative Electoral Formulas
Number of Legislative

PR
2

15/26
7/15

4.0

4/15 (between 1

Chambers.

"
"

Single House District
Magnitude
Higher House District
Magnitude

and 5)

11

1/15

2.EXECUTIVE POWER
"

"

Type of System
Number of Rounds in Elections

Presidential

14/15

2

7/15

3.ELECTORAL OUTCOME

"

Absolute number of parties in
the lower house.

PRD: 58 seats
PRSC: 48 seats

4/15 (three parties
or less)

PLD: 13 seats

Absolute number of parties in
the higher house.

*

PRD: 14 seats
PRSC: 15 seats
PLD:

1 seat

Source: Inter-American Development Bank: Latin America after a Decade of
Reforms: Economic and Social Progress Report, 1997.
PR = Proportional Representation. PL = Plurality System.
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Between December 18 and 20, in three televised speeches, President Fernandez explained
the importance of reforms for the socio-economic development strategy the government

intended to implement. He described the goals of the program: to reach "a sustained
growth of GDP of approximately 7 or 8% a year; an economy based on the private sector
and oriented towards foreign trade; an inflation level below 10% per year; the
equilibrium of the consolidated public sector; doubling the investment of government in
the social sector; and a government principally dedicated to facilitating the operation of
an export economy, to ensure investment in infrastructure and to embrace an integral
strategy to improve equity and eliminate poverty 6 8.
The main economic adjustments presented with the 1997 budget are explain in
table A.III.3 in the appendix. Conveniently, we divide policies into four groups: 1) those
intended to restore economic stabilization;2) those oriented to liberalize the economy; 3)
those applied to reform the tax system; and 4) the social compensation to reduce the
shock on low-income groups.
To reinforce stabilization the government increased fuel prices and liberalized the
petroleum market. These measures attempted to smooth the effect of the periodic changes
in petroleum prices over macroeconomic stability 69 . The government also unified the
exchange rate to a level of RD$14- per U$ causing an official devaluation of 8.8%.
Furthermore, it promised a floating exchange rate system to reduce the anti-export bias

President's speech on December 20, 1996. Reproduce on line in Santo Domingo News at the address:
http://www.drl.com/news/govemment/GN/EcoPlan97.html.
69 The Dominican Republic has an implicit tax calls
"diferencial del petr6leo" ( petroleum differential),
which consists in the revenue generated by the difference between the fixed price of gasoline and the
equivalent international price. At the end of 1996, the price of oil was rising what considerably reduced the
petroleum differential contributing to a potential government deficit.
68
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that traditionally affected the country's economy . These new policies along with a

greater fiscal discipline and a low degree of Executive intervention in Central Bank
operations, allowed to keep inflation low while achieving economic growth (Figure

111.1).

Though effective in economic terms, stabilization measures were highly
unpopular. To avoid widespread discontents, the government undertook a set of
compensation measures. The minimum wage for public servants was increased by 37%.
Salaries for professionals, judges, legislators and others were increased by 40 to 150%.
Additionally, it created a transport subsidy to avoid an increase in the cost of public
transportation. The government made it clear that compensation was only possible
provided the approval of the new tax reform.
Stabilization and compensation were part of the short-term government program.
Structural adjustments were achieved via liberalization and the tax reform. They
represented the real source of conflict in the 1996 reforms. The tariff reform proposed a
reduction of the application of tariffs from eight to only four categories in 1997. Two
years later, most tariff rates were to be unified at a level of 10%. To provide incentive to
the agricultural producers, few farming materials and equipment would pay a preferential
tariff of 1.5%. In addition, the tax reform attempted to compensate the loss of fiscal
resources through the liberalization process. The government aimed to reach a 20% tax
ratio similar to the overall average for Latin America.
Practically all economic agents agreed that tariffs should be reduced. The source
of conflict in the tariff reduction was "by how much and how rapidly". Two
modifications included in the tax reform were the core of controversy: the increase in

70

Dauhajre (1994) explains with details how the economic legislation and the traditional policies applied in
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ITBIS from 8 to 12% in 1997 and up to 19% in 1999; and the treatment of the tax on
corporate profits7 '. The political debate centered on these two fiscal measures and the
gradualism of tariff reform. In the next sub-section we present the political actors of the
1997 budget drama and their position on the reforms.

111.3.2

Actors in the Political Drama

The political economy of the reform approval was characterized by confrontations in
three different arenas. First, the political collision between the President and his party,
PLD, against Congress and its PRD majority. Second, businesses battled between
Consejo Nacionalde la Empresa Privada(CONEP) and Union Nacionalde Empresarios

(UNE). Finally, the economic debate between opposing private consulting firms,
Fundaci6nEconomia y Desarrollo (FEyD), a neo-liberal oriented institution and
Ecocaribe-SigloXXI, a more moderate advising group 72. The confrontation was initially
indirect through different means of communication. Later, it became direct confrontation
when the different interest groups collided in Congress during the budget bill public
sights.
A very popular President Fema'ndez7 3 and several functionaries made contact with
businessmen, union leaders, the press, politicians and other groups in search of political

the Dominican Republic had created a bias against the export sector.
71 The conflictive points in the reform of the tax on Corporate profits were the
elimination of depreciation
and interest payments as deductible expenses to calculate profits and the inclusion of a 1% tax on firm's
gross assets.
72 Table A.IIL4 in the appendix presents an internal radiography of the six political actors. It explains their
origins, their composition and the connections among each other.
7 According to the Rumbo-Gallup poll, in August 1996, 65% of the population approved government
management at the time. See, "News media grades first 100 days of the Fernandez Presidency", Santo
Domingo News, December 6-12, 1996.
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support74 . Moreover, the President met personally with the leaders of the two main
opposition parties. Dr. Balaguer, leader of PRSC, initially offered him support while Dr.
Pena G6mez, leader of PRD said he would present a report of the meeting to the political
committee of his party in order to assume a position regarding the reforms 75.
The budget submitted to Congress on December 21, 1996 was RD$ 33, 626
million. According to Dauhajre (1997) it had already been amended by businesses
influence in their previous meeting with the President. The budget was submitted along
with the reforms described in the previous section. All political actors started to assume
their positions for the upcoming political battle in Congress.
In the business arena, while UNE called the economic package "coherent and
efficient" 76 and endorsed it completely, CONEP disagreed7 7 and recommended a proposal
elaborated by the private consulting firm, Ecocaribe 78. FEyD opposed Ecocaribe's
proposal and firmly defended the government reforms.
Finally, in the political ring, Dr. Pena G6mez carried out his promise to discuss
reform support with the political committee of PRD. The party rejected the budget since
"a law that has an application over a year cannot modify a group of fundamental
(economic) laws" 79. PRD also favored a more gradual reduction in import tariffs, arguing
that as established, "the new reform would result in a massive invasion of imported

74 The steps taken by the government searching support for its reforms are widely described by the written
press. See Listin Diario, Hoy, El Siglo, several newspaper issues between December 1 and 20, 1996.
75 See "Pena G6mez says days of confrontation are over", Santo Domingo News, Dec 27-Jan. 7, 1997.
76 See Santo Domingo News, "Business spokesman favors the measures", Santo Domingo News, January

3-9, 1997.
7" CONEP disagree with the proposal even before its submission. After a meeting in National Palace in
early December, its President, Celso Marranzini, said that "the business sector agrees with a gradual
reduction in import taxes, but rejects any increase in ITBIS because it will be fatal for private business".
See "ITBIS must be increased", Santo Domingo News, November 29-December 5, 1996.
78 See appendix table A.III.4
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products that will affect domestic industries"80 . Even, Dr. Balaguer and PRSC, which
offered support for the policies earlier, were willing "to reject the budget if it contains
measures to raise fuel prices or increase ITBIS" 1 .
In summary, when political negotiations were transferred to Congress, the actors

of the political drama were divided in two blocks: a) a pro-reform block formed by UNE,
FEyD and the government; and b) an anti-reform block led by CONEP in the business
sector, Ecocaribe/SigloXXI in the economic area and PRD in Congress. In the next subsection we explain the evolution of events in the political game.

111.3.3

The Political Game: A Summary of Events

On December 24 1996, a weekend after the budget bill submission, CONEP announced
its position in a press statement8 2 . It called for support of all stabilization measures, but to
reject the tariff reform on the grounds that it would not allow a restructure of the
productive sector8 3. Two days later, the government started to cut on its proposed reform.
It left suspended the abolishment of firm's deductions for depreciation and interest
payments8 4. It also kept the old tax rate on corporate profits deciding against the
reduction to 10%85.

79
80
81

See "Secretary of Presidency says its all or nothing", Santo Domingo News, January 10-16, 1997.
Ibid.
See Santo Domingo News, "Balaguer opposed to ITBIS and fuel price increase", November 29-

December 5, 1996.
82 See Linares (1997), pp. 5 7 - 59 .
8 See table A.III.4 in the appendix.
See "Government amends budget bill", Santo Domingo News, January 24-30, 1997.
85 Though a reduction in the marginal tax rate on Corporate profits from 25 to 10% was a measure designed
to favor the business sector, CONEP protested against it. The problem was that this reduction was
accompanied by the elimination of depreciation and interest payments as deductible business expenses. The
truth is that these deductions have been used in the Dominican Republic to declare annual losses and evade
the payment of the correspondent tax.
84
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Political negotiations had an explicit deadline. The legislative section was to end on
January 12 and every bill not approved by that date would have to wait for the second
legislative section, which would start on February 27. For anti-reform groups, a good
strategy was to delay any decision on the reform proposal. CONEP kept pressuring and in
less than 15 days it reached an agreement with the government to resubmit the budget
with certain modifications 86. The modified reform package was set to be discussed in
Congress on January 17, 1997. The role of different groups during these Congress public
sights constitutes the most important episode of the political game.
During the whole process, the government maintained its position of not
separating the budget bill from the reforms. Isidoro Santana, an economist from
Ecocaribe/SigloXXI presented the position of the anti-reform block at the public sights
when "it urges legislators to split the budget discussion from that of the reforms, not to
file the latter or to arbitrarily reject them, but to be study and discuss with the seriousness

that it merit"8 7 . Both opposition parties in Congress agreed to follow this line, which
practically forced the presidential veto.
The debate to split the reforms from the budget bill centered on the government's
ability to satisfy its expenses with the existing tax system. While Ecocaribe/Siglo XXI
declared that the new budget underestimated government revenues, FEyD argued, that on
the contrary, if approved without the tax reform, the new budget deficit would jeopardize
economic stability. For the former consulting group, the government proposal was made
by FEyD and "it lacked transparency, consensus spirit and teamwork"

86
87
88

See table A.III.5 appendix.
Linares (1997), p. 62 .

See Garcia Michel (1997, 56).
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8. FEyD

replied

that though not its own plan, they did contribute to it by submitting to the government a
macroeconomic medium-term program 9. They also accused economists from
Ecocaribe/SigloXXI of lobbying on behalf of CONEP 90 .
Regardless of the truthfulness of this statement, the position of Ecocaribe/Siglo
XXI constantly coincided with CONEP. Both entities argued that possible alternatives to
halted tax increases were a reduction in government's capital expenses and an
improvement in collections through a reduction of tax evasion9 l. On the other hand, UNE
and FEyD held similar positions as they believed CONEP was disturbing the reform
process. UNE said that for CONEP "the only good reforms are those which allow them to
keep absorbing the greatest proportion of the economic pie"92 . FEyD, through its
president, stated that "Congress is in the hands of the economic powers of the country
(CONEP) and the Executive branch has always been under their influence"93.
On January 24, 1997, a modified budget-reform package that contained the
modifications made through the CONEP-Government agreement was sent to Congress.
Table A.3.5 in the appendix compares the original government package of reforms to the
amended proposal after negotiations with CONEP. The balance of negotiations shows the
"respect" the government had for the most powerful interest group in the country. The
government practically ignored other political actors and a disillusioned Senate said

89
90

91
92

The program at which FE y D refers is Dauhajre and Aristy Escuder (1996).
See Dauhajre (1997, 505) and Dauhajre and Aristy Escuder (1997, 541).

See Linares (1997), pp.31-51 and 60-64.
Ibid., p.74.

93 See "Andy talks frankly", The Santo Domingo News, January 7-14, 1997.
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through its president, Dr. Ram6n Alburquerque that differences with the government
were increasing rapidly 94.
For the new submission, the government had to propose a special legislative
section since the former expired on January 12. In this new section, Senators from the
two opposition parties agreed to split the National Budget from the reform package.
Furthermore, they modified the budget and approved keeping the compensation expenses
while ruling out the new proposed sources of income. They even increased salaries
further. The president vetoed the approved budget and relied on the 1996 budget for the
new fiscal year ending the battle to approve a second wave of reform.
The battle for the 1996 economic reforms had winners and losers. Undoubtedly,
the anti-reform block led by CONEP displayed its power and demonstrated its capacity of
success once again. Though fast and intense, the politics behind the reform approval
process in the Dominican Republic, gives the observer an opportunity to draw important
conclusions. The experience, the organization level and the relative size of the lobby
among other factors, determine the destine of reforms in young democracies with weak
institutions.
In the next two chapters we develop the political economy models and compare
their results to some of the issues discussed in the case study. The first model considers a
weak President, who submits a tariff bill to an anti-reform Congress. The President is
weak in the sense that is led by two opposing lobbies, which play a reduced-form
political game. The second model presents a similar game, but considers a strong

94 See "Budget informally sent to Congress", The Santo Domingo News, January 31-February 6, 1997.
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President, who is allowed only two choices, total reform or status-quo. The President
leads the lobbies in his reform attempt.
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CHAPTER IV
MODEL I: THE CASE OF A WEAK PRESIDENT
IV.1

A General Scheme

The simplest version of the model is represented by the following figure:

Figure IV.1. A General Scheme
Max E (BL )

Max E (BLA)

President
(Agenda-Setter)
Max E (BP)
Submits X*
CP*

CA*

Congress
(Opposition party)
q (k, CP, CA)
accept

reject

Game ends.
(* is applied)

Game ends.
(X"' is applied)

The core of the game is defined by the solid line scheme. It starts with a pro-reformer
president, P, who is the Agenda-Setter. He submits a proposal to an anti-reform
Congress regarding the share of tariff revenue in total tax revenue.

k represents this

proportion. An opposition Congress has no intention of approving the tariff bill unless
some benefits can be drawn from the process. The bill will pass with some probability q
determined by X, and the amount of lobbying contributions, C'. That is, q (k,C') where i =
{p, A}(pro and anti-reform contributions) with the correspondent assumption of
concavity in all arguments. If the policy is approved, the game ends and k*, the optimal
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share of tariff revenue is enforced. If the bill is rejected, the game ends and the status quo
share of tariff revenue X", characterized by a high level of protectionism, is maintained.
I concentrate on the reduced game played by the lobbies L', who act as leaders vis
a vis a welfare-maximizing President. Before any policy submission, the lobbies play a
simultaneous game with no information asymmetries. The game entails deciding the
amount to contribute to Congress so as to influence (indirectly) policy acceptance or
rejection. Lobbies maximize their own expected net benefit, E (BL'). For p, the proreform lobby, E (BLP) increases when

X is reduced

and decreases when contributions

have to be paid. For A, the anti-reform lobby, E (BLA) decreases when

X is reduced and

when contributions have to be paid. Both functions are assumed to be concave with
respect to

X and

C'.

For simplicity, it is also assume that total contributions are equal to total lobby
costs. In other words, a dollar increase in contributions raises total lobbying costs by one
dollar. Therefore, Li's total cost is an increasing linear function of contributions that can
be easily depicted as a 45-degree line'. Figure IV.2 shows the total cost and total benefit
curves for a representative lobby given a share of tariff revenue over total tax revenue. C*
is the level of endogenous contributions chosen by the politically rational lobby. At C*
the net expected benefit for the lobby, E(BL')*, is given by the vertical distance AB,
which is equal to the difference between total benefit (TBL') and total cost (TCL'). For any
other C', this vertical distance is smaller than AB.

'We are ignoring organizational costs at this stage. A full diagrammatic approach to endogenous lobbying

theory with the same sort of assumptions can be found in Brock, Magee and Young (1989). Feenstra and
Bhagwati (1982) show also a diagrammatic approach to endogenous lobbying theory where the cost of
contribution is not a linear function as lobbies have extra costs cause by changes in factor prices due to a
tariff reform or changes in relative price obtained before and after liberalization.
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TBL', TCL'
TCL' =C

A

~

TBL (CI)

B

C*

C'

Figure IV.2
Be aware that the curves depicted in figure IV.2 represent one case of many possible.
There are as many graphs as shares of tariff revenue over total government revenue, k,
exists. In the next section I describe the submitted economic reform and then proceed to
discuss the motivations behind lobbying behavior.
IV.2 Description of the Policy
I assume the President faces a balanced budget where total government expenditure, G, is
exactly equal to total tax revenue, T. Tax receipts can be collected from two sources:
foreign, RF and domestic, RD. Specifically:
G=T=RF +RD
Let

k be the share of tariff revenue

(1)

over total tax revenue (RF = T) and let a be the

proportion of tax revenue collected domestically (RD = aT = [1 -X]T), then aT + T
represents the total tax revenue collected by the government. Assuming a very protected
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economy in the status quo (k >

() 2 , and abstracting

from administrative issues, a

reduction in , represents the reform the President is pursuing.
In terms of the policy itself, a final point must be stressed. Any reduction in the
share of tariff revenue is welfare improving for society since we are assuming a small
open economy. Furthermore, a reduction in the share of tariff revenue in total
government revenue to a level

k=O must be a society's welfare maximizer3.

IV.3 Lobbying Behavior and its Sources of Motivation
Brock, Magee and Young (1989) argue that three motivations drive lobbying behavior.
First, a policy effect that captures the economic benefit obtained by the lobby through the
application of its favored policy. Second, an access effect that captures the expected
economic value of having greater access to party decisions in the future, and third, a
retributioneffect that captures the expected cost imposed on the lobby by the winning
party of an election due to lobby contributions to the looser party. So far, the model does
not include an electoral setting so a retribution effect is not an issue of discussion. We
focus on the policy effect and unless it is explicitly specified in the model, the access
effect is also excluded.
Based on these general assumptions about lobby behavior, I study the interactions
between a pro-reform lobby mainly formed by importers of final goods (commercial

2 This is not a strong assumption since Musgrave (1959) showed that in early stages of development, most
of the tax revenue of countries is collected through custom duties due to administrative constraints and a
shrunk tax-base. More recently, Burgess and Stern (1993), using a sample of eighty-two countries
confirmed Musgrave findings. In the Dominican Republic before the first wave of liberalization in the early
nineties, a proportion of total tax revenue close to 50 %, was collected through customhouses.
3 This presents a puzzle since we might think of liberalization as a measure that add an extra distortion to
the economy, that is, the rise in domestic taxes. To avoid having ambiguous effects over welfare, we
assume non-distortionary domestic taxes, i.e. production taxes and think of tariff as a more distortionary
policy than domestic taxation.
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sector) and an anti-reform lobby formed by import-substituting producers4 . In funding the
Congress, the lobbies face a trade-off: the greater the funds, the greater the probability
that their favored policy will pass, but also, the greater total cost. The former increases
their expected net benefits, whereas the latter reduces their expected net benefits. In
section IV.4, I describe the political game, its players, strategies and payoffs.
IV.4. THE POLITICAL GAME
IV.4.1. The Main Rules: Players, Strategies and Payoffs
Magee (1997) argues that government policies are interest group based and act in
political markets like prices do in economic markets. Policies constitute a system of
signals that determined the behavior of political actors. Of course, part of the gains for
these actors arise from political predation, which is the result of a non-cooperative effort.
Such a setting requires a non-cooperative game where the political players (P and L1)
interact strategically in the decision-making process.
Any political structure with only a few participants dominating the political
scenario can be related to an oligopolistic framework in an economic market, and model
itself with non-cooperative games5 . A solution for this type of game is a Nash
Equilibrium where none of the players have an incentive to deviate from that particular
position. The game in this version is a static game where players have the same amount
of information despite the probabilistic Congress equation.

The idea of a pro-reform lobby is drawn from observations of the liberalization process in the Dominican
Republic. In the early nineties, a new powerful lobby formed by importers of final goods and members of
the commercial sector under the name of UNE appeared. UNE stands for the translation to Spanish of
National Union of Entrepreneurs.See chapter III for the details of the battle of the lobbies in the
Dominican Republic.
s Non-cooperative game theory is covered in Funderberg and Tirole (1989). The article is collected in
Schmalensee, R and Willig, R.D. (editors), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol. I, 1989. In the same
volume, Carl Shapiro presented a comprehensive study on oligopoly theory.
a
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Players in the model are assumed to be expected net benefit maximizers. The President,
P, maximizes his expected net benefit by choosing ), and the lobbies maximize their
expected net benefit by choosing C'. Each player's strategy is given by X s [0,ksq) and C'
6 [O,C "].

A typical strategy for P is a choice of O k*<ks6. A typical strategy for any

lobby L' is a choice of O<CI*<C' n.ax. Payoffs are obtained through optimization
problems of the political agents. For the President the expected benefit, E(BE), is equal to:
E(BP) = q(2, C )W(2) + [1 - q(2,

Where:

Ci )]W(S9 )

(2)

k = Proportion of total tax revenue collected

through tariffs.
C' = Lobby contributions to Congress and i = {p, A}.
W = Society's welfare and Wx < 0 and W < 0.
q = The probability that the Congress will approve the reform and qx >0,
qcP>0, qcA<0, qcPcP<0, qcACA<o, %x<0.
1 - q = The probability that the Congress will reject the reform.
-sq=

Proportion of tax revenue collected through tariffs in the status quo.

The payoff for a typical lobby is obtained from the maximization of its expected net
benefit E (BL'), in which:
E(BL

Where:

) =q(2, C )U' (2) +[1 - q(A,C')]U'

(ls)-

C'

(3)

U'() = Expected utility received by the respective lobbies if the policy is
approved.
U'(qJ) = Expected utility received by the respective lobbies in the status
quo when the policy is rejected.
UPx < 0, UPXX < 0, UA> 0,UAXX<0

At this stage the game is fully defined with players, strategies and payoffs. The game
theoretic equilibrium concept is Nash equilibrium similar to the Cournot game in
economics where two firms (lobbies) choose production quantities (contributions). In the
6

Observe the President chooses his typical strategy from a continuum
of policies. In the second model,

50

next sub-section, I focus on the reduced-form game played by the two lobbies before the
agenda is undertaken.

IV.4.2. Playing The Reduced Lobbying Game
In the reduced-form game, lobbies endogenize the solution of a weak President7 , who
maximizes his expected net benefit in the following manner:
Max

E(B,) = q(2,CP,CA )W(2 )+[
(+)
c

Jq

(+)

2,Cp,C^ )[

3>

WELFARE

)]

V(

(-)

(+)

+ [ V/'(/)] q(,C p, C^A)=0

-EFFECT

(2)

)]W(Sq)

-q(2,CP',A

BRAKE

(4)

-EFFECT

The President's expected net benefit is affected by two forces: a positive welfare effect
given by y = [W (k) - W

(k

4)], which is the extra benefit provided to society with the

new policy, and a negative distortion effect that acts as a liberalization brake given the
trade-off the President faces. That is, the lower the tariff the greater W, but also the lower
the probability that the bill will pass. Lets now turn to the lobbies problem.
The pro-reform lobby maximizes its expected net benefit given by equation 5:
Max
C'

(+))

[

32

E(Bf)=q(,,CP,CA)UP(Y)+[I-q(l,C ,C^)]Up(A*)Cp

gg()

(-)

(+)

(2,CP,
C,)#z(2)+'(2)q(2,Cp,CA)]

(+)

d

d2
dC'

(5)

q(+)

+

XP

(2,CP,CA)[(A) ] = 1

(6)

MPC

MPB

Where:

(,)

=

U,( ) - U,( )s) > 0, 4'(k) < 0 and 4"(k) < 0.

developed in chapter V, P faces a discrete choice between total reform and status-quo protectionism.
7 The reader must think of the weakness of the President as "not being too committed to reform". A strong
President, therefore, would be that "committed to reform".
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Equation 6 presents the optimal solution of the pro-reform lobby. The lobby chooses how
much to contribute (C*) by equating its marginal political benefit (MPBP) to its marginal
political cost (MPCP). Figure IV.3 illustrates this process.
MPCP

MPBP

PB

CP

CP*

Figure IV.3
The marginal political cost is equal to one so it is represented by a horizontal line. The
marginal political benefit curve is downward sloping as total benefit increases at a
decreasing rate. For levels of CP below CP*, MPBP > MPCP, implying that the lobby is
under-contributing. The opposite happens for values of CP above CP*. The expected net
benefit of engaging in political activities for members of lobby p is represented by the
shaded area.
The expected net benefit of the anti-reform lobby is written as:
Max
C

E(BL)=q( ,Cp,C^)UA'Z)+[1-q( ,C°,C^)]U^(,")-C^

(7)

E(BLA) = the expected net benefit of the anti-reform lobby.
UA(k)= the expected utility received by the anti-reform lobby if the policy
is approved.
UA(ksg) = the expected utility received by the anti-reform lobby if the
policy is rejected.
CA = the level of anti-reform contributions to Congress.

Where:

Lobby A, the first order condition obtained from equation 7 yields:

_

(

2)-

A

,C,C

()

Ad

_(+)

dC^

+

(()

(-)

KC

A]

-

+ O'(A)q(2aC',CA) d A=

MPB
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dC^

1
MPC

(8)

O[k] = UA(k) - UA(ksq) < 0, 0'[k] > 0 and 0"[k] < 0.

Where:

As its rival the pro-reformer, Lobby A chooses its optimal contribution level by
comparing marginal political benefits and costs. While MPCA is equal to one, MPBA has
two components: a positive element defined by the influence of anti-reform contributions
over q and k, and a negative welfare effect given by the element 0'[X], which decreases
whenever the share of tariff revenue declines due to anti-reform contributions.
The next step is to study strategic interactions between the lobbies. To understand
how a lobby responds to changes in its rival's behavior, I must get its reaction function.
The pro-reform lobby best response function, CP* (CA), is obtained implicitly from
equation 6 and similarly, the reaction function CA*(Cp) of the anti-reform lobby, is found
in equation 8. A diagrammatic representation of such functions requires the estimation of
their slopes.
Let E(BL)= F(k, CP, CA) to ease the notation of the pro-reform lobby problem.
Rewriting and totally differentiating the first order condition in equation 6, I get
dCP/dCA, the slope of the pro-reform lobby reaction function.

Fc,(2t,CP,CA)+FA(2,CP,CA) dC =0
+

[F

d,

d__

+ F dC ]d2 + [F

+F

d
H-

dCA

_[FCpA

d__

dCl ]dC + [Fc",+ F c" dC

(

dC

(+)
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2

dC

+

2

]dCp = 0

H-

d

+F

+F

d

(+)

+ FAA dC] dC^- [Fcc + F

F

(9)

+F

d 2,

C

C

(11)
<

(10)

Equation 11 shows an ambiguous sign for the slope of the pro-reform lobby's best
response function. I must stress two important issues. First, observe d/dC' and d'X/dC 2
are outcomes from the endogeneization of the President maximization problem. Second,
notice Fc~x is the only element with an ambiguous sign 9 . Regardless of it sign, [FcPx +
Faxda/dCP], the first element in bracket in the numerator, is positivel.

To obtain the slope of the anti-reformer's reaction function, I follow the same
procedure applied for the pro-reform lobby. Let E(BLA) = G (X,CP,CA) to ease the
notation of the anti-reform lobby problem. Rewriting and totally differentiating the first
order condition in equation 8, I get dCAdCP, the slope of the anti-reform lobby reaction
function.
Gc,(2,C',CA)+ G,(,,CP,CA)

=0

(12)

dC

d~/~[CApG
2
dCAc"]dCP +

[GdA+G
(GcA j + GA dC ]d/+C[Gc, + G

dcC

dCA

dZ

+ GwA dCA + G

dC

(+)

(+)

H

d?
[GcAcA

d2

[G/C dCA dC ]-(GCAcp

cC"G

+ Gd/_
GCACAG
_-)

AA

)
H (-)

d/CA
dC

c/C

(+)

d2
dC )

W
+ GC

(+).

d_2_
dA, ]dCA =0

H

dl?

GcA^c/C

> 0

(14)

+ G d'
{ dA2
(+

dC

The computation of the different partials in equation 11 is developed in section A.4.1 of the appendix. The
signs of these partials and others in the anti-reformer best response function require some extra
assumptions. I further assume that qlcP < 0, qcpx < 0, gCA > 0, CA <0 and qCpCA < 0 and justify these
assumptions where is pertinent with a diagrammatic approach.
9 All elements in equation 11 are computed in section A.4.1 of the appendix.
10 The proof is in section A.4.1 of the appendix and require the use of equations a.4.6 and a.4.7.
8
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(13)

The reaction function for the anti-reform lobby is upward sloping provided the element
d'k/dCA2, obtained from the President's problem, is insignificantly small".
Proposition I
In the linear case,
(a) the element d 2 2/dC 2 is zero and the anti-reform lobby's reaction curve is upward
sloping.
(b) the element d 2A/dCp2 is zero and the shape of the pro-reform lobby's reaction curve
depends on the following condition:

dC'
i)

dCA
dC

d2

>

<

0

iff

[Fc

+F
(+)

d2

>

d ]dA
dC dC

<

d2
[Fc CA +F

d
dC

(+)-)

Proposition I states two possible graphical cases: either both curves are upward sloping
and lobbies regard each other contributions as strategic complements, or only the proreform lobby's curve is downward sloping 12 . The first case is more likely to occur either
when the president is not too committed to reform (dk/dCA is large) or when the proreform lobby cares more about the policy than about the adverse effect of anti-reform
contributions on its expected net benefit (Fcpx>FcPCA and/or FAA >F cA).
The diagrammatic expressions presented in figure IV.4 provide our two possible
equilibrium solutions for the linear case. We should observe that although we have talked

" The signs of the different partial derivatives that are components of equation 14 are found in section

A.4.2 of the appendix.

The first case assume complementarity among levels of contributions. That is, when a pro-reform lobby
group decides to provide more funds, its rival, an anti-reform self-interested group reacts by providing also
more funding. The second case suggests that the anti-reform lobby regards contributions as complements
while the pro-reformer regards them as substitutes. Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985) argue that
this is possible in oligopoly theory, only if we assume that the former is large compared to the latter. One
might think of the anti-reform lobby as having some sort of advantage since the opposition Congress is also
an anti-reformer.
12
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about two best response functions, in real terms, such functions are not. Best response
functions require some sort of dynamic setting and this framework is strictly static. In our
model, lobbies do not react to an opponent's strategy, rather they move simultaneously.
CA

CA

CR

CACRA)

C--A*---- -

CR(

RA

CA* -

-

--

-

- CR (CR)

CP

CP

Figure IV.4(a)

Cp
Figure IV.4(b)

Figure IV.4(a) depicts a typical graph for the linear case with strategic complement
contributions and perfect symmetry' 3 . Figure IV.4(b) shows the case where the proreform lobby sees anti-reform contributions as a substitute good. In other words, proreform's reaction to more anti-reform funding is to be less aggressive as its profitability
from funding Congress decreases.
I should point that with different functional forms, there is no guarantee that the
curves cross at some point in the plane. It is perfectly possible to have a graph like the
one depicted in figure IV.5, where RLA and RLP represent the respective reaction
functions of the anti-reform and the pro-reform lobby.

13 Dixit (1987) in a paper on contests presents different asymmetric cases where the favorite best response
function in the neighborhood of N.E. is upward sloping whilst the underdog best response curve is
downward sloping in the same vicinity.
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CP

CA

RA

Figure IV.5

CP

Tirole (1989) discusses two sets of assumptions under which is possible to get existence
of a pure strategy equilibrium in a Cournot framework between two firms. The first group
assumes each firm's profit function has to be concave in its own choice. The second
approach follows Novshek (1985) and shows that if a firm's marginal revenue increases
with the competitor's output, a pure strategy equilibrium exists. I already assume
concavity of the expected net benefit functions, so existence is drawn from our previous
assumptions . However, even if it exists, equilibrium need not to be unique. With a
nonlinear functional form, it is possible to obtain multiple equilibria as depicted in figure
IV.6. The case is irrelevant for our purposes, but it still exists.
CA
RLp

Cmax

C

/a
RLA

CP

Figure IV.6

"4 The analysis of existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in this section is based on Tirole (1988, pp. 224-

228), Friedman (1977, 69-83 and 1986, 34-47), Gibbons (1992, pp. 29-48) and Biermann and Fernandez
(1998, pp. 38-41).
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In searching for uniqueness, a sufficient condition for reaction curves to intersect only
once is that wherever they intercept, the reaction function of p should be greater than the

reaction function of A15 . For our model, this condition will hold if the reaction functions
are less than 1 in absolute value over the relevant ranges' . Therefore, a sufficient
condition for uniqueness is:
ii)

Fec,

>

Fcc

and

GcAC^

>

GCACP

The solution to these derivatives is included in appendix A.4.3. The expressions are fairly
complicated to be conclusive. The fact is that assuming a unique, stable and interior Nash
equilibrium in these models have been more the rule than the exception. In lobbying
economies, Findlay and Wellisz (1982), Wellisz and Wilson (1986), Hall and Nelson
(1992), Brock, Magee and Young (1989) and others, either assumed or did not address
the question of the existence of an equilibrium in their respective games".
In the next section I turn to the President problem and study how is affected by
the lobbying game. Then I proceed to do some comparative static exercises in the
reduced-form lobbying game. Departing from the strategic complements setting, that is,
from an equilibrium like the one depicted in figure IV.4(a), I explore the effects of a
change that makes public opinion less supportive of the reform, over the contributions of
the lobbies.

"s See Tirole (1989).
16 Friedmand (1977) shows that this is a sufficient and necessary
condition for a contraction.
17 Pant (1997) analyzes this issue in a chapter strictly dedicated to review the endogenous tariff literature.
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IV.5 The Real Game: The President Submits the Policy
Recall the structure of our model depicted in the general scheme in figure IV. 1. The
reduced-form political game between the lobbies that we just solved preceded the
submission of the policy to Congress. The result of the lobbying game affect P's decision
indirectly through its pervasive influence over Congress behavior.
As before, the agenda-setter submits the policy,

X*,

by maximizing his expected

benefit function. The difference with his previous objective function is that the chosen
level of contributions in the reduced-form game, Cp* and CA*, are now part of the
arguments of function q, the probability of obtaining Congress approval. P's problem
could be posed as:
Max

E(B,) = q(2, CO*, CA* )W(, ) + [1- q(?, C"*, CA* )]W C(
(+)

dE(B )

1, (p,C

,C* )[

(15)

H

(+

-

S)

(2)] +[ V'(,i)] q(,CI* ,CA*)=o

WELFARE-EFFECT

(16)

BRAKE-EFFECT

Equation 16 presents the correspondent solution or first order condition for P's problem.
As we explained before, the President balances a welfare and a liberalization-brake effect
in his decision-making process. The chosen share of tariff revenue over total tax revenue,
X, depends on which effect dominates. A decrease in

k increases society's welfare, but

serve also as a brake for Congress approval. The President is aware the lobbies are
playing an important role in shaping Congress' behavior. Although he is not a selfinterested politician, he is indirectly affected by this negative influence.
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Let's turn back to the reduced-form lobbying game to study how an external shock, a

change in public opinion against the reform, alters the lobbies' decision of how much to
contribute to advance their favored policy.
IV.6 Comparative Statics: A Change in Public Opinion
Assume q is affected inversely by a parameter P, that collects any event that decreases the
probability of the Congress passing the bill. That is, qp<0 18 . Specifically, we are thinking
in terms of a change in public opinion favoring protectionism

9

. Departing from the

interior equilibrium shown in figure IV.5(a), I study the effect of changes in the
parameter P over the two opposing level of contributions, CP and CA. Recall the first
order conditions of the lobbies' problem represented by equations 6 and 8 to include
parameter

p:
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gy(+)
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[ (, CO, CA;,)#(2)+0'(2) q(2, CO, CA;, )] dC
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(+)
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MPC
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In general form, we can rewrite equations 16 and 17 as:

Fc,( ,C',CA;/) +FA(,CP,CA;,g) dC
GcA, C',CA;)

+ G2AC, CA;)

d2
A

=0

(18)

=0

(19)

dC

Remember we previously assumed that q is concave with respect to all its arguments. We hold that
assumption for parameter 3.
19 A change in public opinion that favors protectionism logically represents less support for the reform. In
the events that affected the Dominican Republic in 1996, the Press played an important role turning public
opinion against the reform. We want to think about parameter 0 as collecting this pervasive effect.
18
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These two equations represent the same first order conditions from the lobbies
maximization problem with a single addition. Now, the first partials are also influenced
by parameter p, so the decision-making process of the lobbies is affected not only by the
policy and the level of contributions, but also by an external negative shock provided by
the change in public opinion against the reform. The total differentiation of equations 18
and 19 yields:

dA 2 +[d,
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]dCA =0

Observe that equations 20 and 21 include the mixed partials with respect to parameter (3,
keeping other lobby behavior fixed. Manipulating these equations algebraically, we
obtain equations 22 and 23, which tell us how a change in public opinion affects each
lobby's level of contribution.
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d

2
C,

+ G

>d

-0

(23)

(21)

The denominators of both expressions are exactly the same of equations 11 and 14. The
numerators include all the partial derivatives with respect to parameter 320.
Proposition II
An increase in 6(a change in public opinion against the reform) leads to:
(a) a decrease in anti-reform contributions, C.
(b) an increase or decrease in pro-reform contributions, C, depending on
b.1. how committed is the President to reform (the magnitude of d2./d).
b.2. how the sensitivity of the pro-reform lobby's expected net benefit with respect
to the policy and its own contributions (F2 and Fc") is affected by the change in
public opinion and the policy itself

The effect of a change in public opinion on pro-reform contributions can be summarized
in condition i:
(+)

iii)

dC'
d
d#

-o<

(-)

>_[F

>

iff

[FcA +FA

dC

d, <

Observe that if Fk and FcP are more sensitive to changes in

[FC/

+
+F

d2
dC

k than to changes in

parameter P, for a given level of dk/ds, it is more likely dCP/ds3 would be positive.
Assuming this is the case an increase in parameter P (a change in public opinion against
the reform) causes a more aggressive behavior of the pro-reform lobby. Figure IV.7
illustrates this hypothetical case. It might be plausible to hold this assumption since

p

affects the expected utility of Lobby p only indirectly while the policy exerts a direct
influence on it.

20 The signs of these partials are found in section A.4.4. of the appendix.
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CA

CA*
RP'
CA*'

CP* CP*

C

Figure IV.7
A change in public opinion that favors protectionism shifts both reaction curves outward.
Equilibrium move from point a to b yielding a higher level of contributions by Lobby p
and a lower level of funding by Lobby A. The country study on the Dominican reform
process presented in chapter III provides some empirical support for the behavior of the
pro-reform lobby in this model.
One might argue that during the Dominican affair, Lobby p cares more about the
policy than about any other influence on the reform contest. On the contrary, the behavior
of the anti-reform lobby is not well explained by this framework. However, the second
model developed in chapter V, where the President is strongly committed to reform,
suitably explained Lobby A's reaction to the change in public opinion.
IV.7. Conclusions
This paper presented the case of a weak President, not too committed to reform, who is
led by opposing lobbies in his policy submission. Lobbies endogenize the President's
solution as they choose the optimal level of funding to be provided to an opposition
Congress. The reduced-form lobbying game yields two possible linear equilibrium. In the
first equilibrium, lobbies regard each other contributions as strategic complements. An
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increase in the contributions of Lobby A makes Lobby p to compete and increase its
provision of funds. In the second equilibrium, while Lobby A perceives its rival's
contributions as strategic complements, Lobby p sees A's contributions as strategic
substitutes.

Two factors determine the final equilibrium. First, how committed the President is
to reform (the size of dX/dCP and dk/dCA) and second, how changes in

k and CA

affect

the sensitivity of the pro-reformer's expected benefit to changes in the policy and its own
contributions (the magnitude of F x, FcPx, Fxcp and FcPCA)
A turn in public opinion toward protectionism (an increase in

p) causes Lobby A

to decrease contributions since an opposition Congress needs less bribery to reject the
reform. The reaction of the pro-reform lobby depends on two forces. First, how
committed the President is to reform. Second, how the pro-reform lobby weighs the
influence of policy vis a vis other variables on its expected net benefit. If Lobby p cares
more about the policy than about any other variable, it will increase its contributions
while tries to smooth the effect of public opinion on the Congress' willingness of
approval. This seems to be the case in the Dominican Republic in 1996, where the proreform lobby behaved more aggressively as public opinion turned against the reform.
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CHAPTER V

MODEL II: THE DISCRETE CASE
OF A COMMITED PRESIDENT
The second model considers a strong president, who faces a discrete choice between total
reform and a protectionist status quo. The President acts as a leader vis a vis the lobbies,
incorporating the solution of the reduced-form lobbying game in his decision-making
process. The lobbying game is set as a tariff contest where two contenders (lobbies) exert
effort (contributions) to increase the probability of winning a prize (the policy). The
chances of wining the prize are determined by the probability of policy approval in
Congress.
V.1 Schematic Representation of the Game
A President, P, faces a discrete choice between total liberalization (TL) and the status quo
(SQ) in a small open developing economy. To achieve TL he has to set the share of tariff
revenue over total government revenue, X, equal to zero. The status quo represents the
actual state of the world where X=Xs21. The following extensive form game tree serves as
a general scheme for the model:
Lobby A

CA

accept

S Game Ends

TL (X* = 0)
President, P

Congress

q= [ CP/[CA+Cp]

SQ (X*

Game Ends

-

?xs5)

Lobby p

65

reject

*

Game Ends

The President is the agenda-setter and moves first in the overall sequential game. An
opposition Congress moves second and either accepts or rejects the proposal with some

probability q. The overall game is drawn in solid lines. The game ends if P chooses the
status quo or, once Congress chooses to accept or reject if P chooses to liberalize.
Congress' behavior is determined exogenously and it acts like a black-box where the
final policy decision is taken.
I must stress two important issues of the game. First, unless we impose a fixed

cost for the President when proposing, SQ is a weakly dominated strategy since the worst
payoff the President could get by pursuing TL is exactly equal to the best payoff he could
achieved with the alternative strategy. Second, having an anti-reformer Congress implies
an automatic rejection of the policy unless the Assembly is motivated otherwise. We
assume that Congressmen are self-interested politicians whose decision depends on
lobbies' funding. Consequently, there is a reduced-form lobbying contest preceding the
overall game.
The lobbying game is defined in the general scheme with dashed lines. Two
opposing lobbies play a simultaneous move game in which they choose the level of
contribution that will be provided to Congress. An anti-reform lobby, A, contributes to
decrease q or the probability of policy approval while a pro-reform lobby, p, contributes
to increase it. A Nash equilibrium for such setting is represented by a common point
where every lobby maximizes its own expected net benefit given the other lobby's
choice. The President incorporates the equilibrium outcome to his expected net benefit

For the description of the policy and the relevant assumptions on the different variables in this model,
we
refer the reader to chapter IV.
21
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function, before deciding whether to propose or not. In the next section I estimate the
equilibrium of the lobbying game and then move toward the general setting.

V.2. The Lobbying Game: Estimating the Reaction Process
The lobbying game is a contest where opposing special interest groups expend effort in
the form of contributions to win a prize. The prize for each lobby is represented by their
respective expected net benefit E(B)

obtained from the policy, where i = {A,p}. Dixit

(1987) define any bribery to receive a lucrative license or a contract from a government
as a contest . He uses two types of function to define the probability of winning such
prize: the probit and the logit functions. I use the latter to define q or the probability of
Congress approval (wining a prize). Let's start by looking at the pro-reform lobby
maximization problem.
The pro-reform lobby supports TL, so it tries to influence q in such a way that a
new level of

k equal to zero is approved. Let q =

{CP/ (CA + C)} and 1-q, the probability

of Congress rejection be 1 - {CP/ (CA+ CP)} = {CA/ (CA+ Cp)} 2 3. Applying these
definitions to our traditional pro-reform lobby maximization problem, we get:

Max
C'

C7'

E(Bf)= C+ A
C +C^

U,(2 = )+[1-

C"

C A ]U'(2 = ZqS )-C
Cp+C^

(1)

F.O.C

22 Other political and economic interactions have been studied as contests. See chapter I for a brief review

of the contest literature.
2 We are aware of the limitations of choosing this type of function. In axiomatizing the logit function,
Skaperdas (1994) assume that the winning probability of each player in a contest depend on the difference
in efforts. In our model that is the same of saying that q depends only on the size of the difference between
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[
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(Cp + CA )
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(C +C )2
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= x5)=1
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= 1

(3)

CA
(Cp+CA)

2

[Up(2=0)-Up(2 =

Se)]

MPB

Where:

> 0, ' < 0, " < Oand Ca > 0.

Observe

4 is the utility differential for the pro-reform lobby between

the two policy

options in our discrete game. I relate this utility differential to the size of the lobbies and
use the alternative interpretation indistinctly. The larger the lobby, the more it has to gain
from pursuing its favored policy.
Equation 3 states that Lobby p optimally chooses the level of contributions that
equates marginal political benefits (MPB) to marginal political costs (MPC). The MPC is
constant and equal to one given our assumption of zero lobby organizational cost2 4 . The
MPB depends on two elements: lobbies' contributions and the expected utility
differential,

4. Total

liberalization increases p's welfare through the expected utility

differential, so as long as MPB exceeds 1 the pro-reform lobby would be willing to
increase contributions. One can manipulate equation 3 and solve for CP as an explicit
function of CA. The outcome, equation 4, yields the reaction function for the pro-reform
lobby to the level of contributions chosen by the anti-reformer.

Cp = [C'#] -CA

(4)

opposing contributions. This strong assumption suggests that q should be equal for a case where Ca = 10
and CP= 100 and a case where Ca = 1,000,000 and C = 1,000,090.
24 Specifically, total lobbying costs equate the total amount of contributions as explained
in the previous
chapter.
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The origin is definitely a point on the reaction curve. If A decides not to contribute, p's

best response will also be not to contribute. To figure out the shape of the best response
curve, I totally differentiate equation 4 and solve for the element dCP/dCA, the slope of
the reaction function:

-C [z ]2 -1
dCA

(5)

2 CA

The shape of the reaction curve for the pro-reform lobby, RP, depends on the level of
anti-reform contributions, CA. It will be different for low and high levels of CA. Let CA
be the level of anti-reform contributions that makes 1/2 [4/ CA]1/ 2 equal to 1. Then, for
levels of CA below CA , the element 1/2 [4/ CA]1/ 2 is large enough to offset 1 and the best
response curve is upward sloping. For levels of Ca above Ca, the element 1/2 [4/ Ca]

is

smaller than 1 and the best response curve is downward sloping.
CA

RP = CP-'(CA)
_C

Figure V.1
Notice in figure V.1 that for values of CA below CA, the pro-reform lobby responds to
more aggressive behavior of its rival (an increase in CA) with a greater effort in
searching for the contest prize (an increase in CP). Following the industrial organization
literature, the pro-reform lobby perceives anti-reform contributions as strategic
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complements 25. On the contrary, for levels of CA above CA, the pro-reform lobby's best
response to more aggressive anti-reformer's behavior is to reduce its general effort, so it
perceives anti-reform contributions as strategic substitutes.

Using the same logit form for the probabilistic function, I turn to the anti-reform
lobby maximization problem. The expected net benefit is given by:

Max
C^

E(BA) =

C

p,CCAC
+ C
;

U

= 0)+[1 -

A.

C

C,
+ C

]U^ Ai =

'q )-C^A

(6)

F.O.C.
C

(CP + CA ) 2

[U (A

= 0) - U A (=

C"
-

2

(CP+CA)

[9]= 1

)] = 1

(7)

(8)

MPB

Where:

0 = [U(<=0)-U(k=ksq)] < 0, 0'(k) > 0 and 0"(X) < 0.

Equation 8 represents implicitly how the anti-reform lobby makes contribution decisions.
As expected, it chooses contributions by comparing marginal political benefits to
marginal political costs. Solving CA as a function of CP gives us the explicit reaction or
best response function for the anti-reform lobby.

CA =-[C'202 ]_Cp

(9)

By totally differentiating equation 9 and solving algebraically for dCA/dCP, I obtain the
slope of the reaction curve:

10

dCA
dCp
25

=-

-

2 C'

See Tirole (1989), and Bulow et al (1985).
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]2

-1

(10)

Again, the slope depends on the size of the other lobby's contributions. Let CP be the
level of pro-reform contributions that equates -1/2[/CP]/

CP, -1/2[/CP]/

2

2

to 1. For levels of CP below

is greater than 1, so the slope is positive and the anti-reformer sees p's

contributions as a strategic complement. On the other hand, for levels of CP that exceeds
CP, the element -1/2[O/CP]"

2

is smaller than 1, the slope is negative and the anti-reformer

sees p's contributions as a strategic substitute. The reaction curve of the anti-reform
lobby, RA, is represented by the inverse U-shaped curve depicted in figure V.2.
CA

RA = CA(CP)

CP

CP

Figure V.2
V.3. Equilibrium in the Lobbying Game
The next step is to establish the equilibrium of the lobbying game or the point at which
no lobby has an incentive to switch its position given its rival's location. Such point is
found at the intersection of the two reaction curves. Recall equations 4 and 9, the best
response functions of the lobbies, plugging one into the other I get the Nash equilibrium
levels of contributions, CP* and CA*, as functions of

and 0. Keep in mind these

parameters stand for the expected utility differentials or the size of the lobbies.
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-

CA*

(11)

#2

C'*=

8-#

2

-

-

-

2

1

-

(12)

e-#

B-#

The Nash equilibrium is given by equation 13:
- 2

-

(C'*,CA*)=

L

-

[2#

-2

-

[2]

(13)

CP*, the contributions of the pro-reform lobby could be greater, equal or less at

equilibrium than CA*, the contributions of the anti-reform lobby. Overall, we have three
possible diagrammatic representations. First, if both levels of contributions were exactly
equal at equilibrium, we would have perfect symmetry and equilibrium would lie on a 45
degree line that represents the locus of points that satisfy CP* = CA*. Figure V.3. shows
the perfect symmetric case.

CA

450

RP

CA*
RA

CP*= CP

CP

Figure 5.3
Second, if CP* exceeds CA* the equilibrium will lie to the right of the 45 degree line, like
in the picture depicted in figure V.4. Drawing from Dixit (1987) we could argue that in
this particular case the pro-reform lobby is considered to be a favorite. By the same
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token, its rival would be considered the underdog of this tariff contest 26. Baik and
Shogren (1992) showed that for such a case the favorite's (the pro-reformer) expected net
benefit E(BLP) is decreasing when one moves up along its reaction curve. So, as

contributions by lobby A increase the expected benefit of the pro-reformer decreases for
every level of his own contribution CP27.
CA
45°

RP

CA*

CP*

C

Figure V.4
The third possible case occurs when CP* is less than CA* and the equilibrium lies to the
left of the 45 degree line. In such case, shown in figure V.5., the anti-reformer becomes
the favorite and the pro-reformer, the underdog.
CA

CA*

CP*

C

ure V.5

____________________Fig

Being a "favorite" in the lobbying contest imnplies having a probability of winning the prize that exceeds
50% in the Nash Equilibrium.
26
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Proposition III
When a strong Presidentfaces a discrete choice between total reform and status-quo and
the probabilityof Congress approval assumes a logitform offunction, the reduced-form
lobbying game equilibrium depends on the size of the lobbies in such a way that 28

(a)

if

When

|

101 exceeds #

C'*

CA*

initially, the model yields an equilibrium similar to the one depicted

in figure V.5. In other words, when the membership of Lobby A exceeds that of Lobby p,
the anti-reform lobby has more to lose than what its rival has to gain. Provided the
historical background of protectionism in the Dominican Republic described in chapter
II, one can argue that loosing the privilege of high tariffs was tougher for those who
enjoyed it for years, than what gaining liberalization was, for a pro-reformer sector who
never enjoyed it before.
The other asymmetric case illustrated in figure V.4 arises when

exceeds 101 at

the original equilibrium. That is, the pro-reform lobby is larger than the anti-reformer and
receives a greater level of extra utility than what the anti-reform lobby loses from total
liberalization. Examples of such case are difficult to find in developing countries that
applied an inward-oriented development strategy.
Dixit (1987) explains that in any contest with a logit functional form, the player
favored to win has a strategic incentive to overcommit effort. In the case depicted in
figure V.5, where A's membership is larger than p's membership, the favorite anti-

27 Whenever the anti-reform lobby increases Ca or its level of effort, the probability of Congress approval q
decreases, therefore reducing the pro-reformer's expected payoff.
28 The algebraic manipulation to obtain condition (a) is included
in the appendix, section A.5.1.
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reformer would overexert if one allows precommitment in the model29 . This outcome can

be related to what happened in the Dominican Republic in 1996, where the anti-reform
block started to overexert way before the trade reform was submitted to Congress. At the
an opposition Congress, rejected the proposal since the pro-reform could not motivate it
otherwise. Let analyze the effect of changes in the size of the lobbies over the Nash
equilibrium level of contributions.
V.4 Comparative Statics: Changes in Utility Differentials
Equation 13 defines the Nash Equilibrium levels of contributions in terms of the size of
the lobbies,

# and 0.

The aim in this section is to study how such equilibrium is affected

by changes in the membership of a lobby, holding constant the membership of its rival. I
start with parameter 4, which could be interpreted as the size of the pro-reform lobby or
alternatively, as its expected utility differential. Recall the first order conditions found in
the maximization problem of the lobbies.

Cp = [C^#]2 -CA

CA

=

(4)

-[Cp2O 2 ]-CP

(9)

The total differentiation of equations 4 and 9 yields:

dC" + dCA(1

1i

0

2 C^

)=

2

#

d

(14)
(4

29 Overexerting is a plausible outcome as long as we do not endogenized the order of moves between the

two players. Baik and Shogren (1992) found that by endogenizing the order of moves between a favorite
and an underdog, the latter will always move first and the former, second. With this order of moves instead
of overexerting both players will under exert with respect to the Nash equilibrium.
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1

(1+

KCjdO

C'

2

1

C

)dC' +dCA =

-

2

(15)

B

I can write equations 14 and 15 in matrix form:

1

I

1

2

CA

2

1
2

-

2

dC](6
-

C^-

2

(C'

0

1

CA

2

#

dCA

1

do
16

C

1
2

2

B

A sufficient condition for stability of the system of equations is that the determinant of
the first left-hand side matrix is positive. This occurs only if (Cp/0) > (CA/(), so I assume
this condition exists3 0. The determinant is given by equation 17.

A =-

1

#

(12

2 1)(+

C

2
-

2

21

21

1_

A=-_0_

2

A#

C^

2

_

CO )

--

+-

2

1

1

_

( CP )

]

>0

_0

2

(C

(17)

Letting dO = 0 and applying Cramer's rule, we get the effect of changes in parameter 4
over the different levels of contributions:

dCPAd

CA 211
>+0
L 1 cI(

(18)

A

do

A

A

_

-

2-0

B

2)1

)(CA

A
(+)

+

30 See section A.5.2 in the
appendix.
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CA2

(19)

Proposition IV
An increase in the size (utility differential) of the pro-reform lobby,

, holding constant

the size of the anti-reform lobby, 6, leads to
(a)

an increase in pro-reform contributions, C"

(b)

an increase or decrease in the anti-reform level of contributions, CA, depending
b.1. on the original size of the anti-reform lobby, 6
b.2. on the initial level ofpro-reform contributions C'.

Intuitively, when the membership of the pro-reform lobby increases, there are more
individuals demanding liberalization what makes the lobby increase contributions. For
the anti-reform group, its willingness to compete (increase contributions) depends on its
relative size when equilibrium is reached. The smaller CP or the greater 0, the more likely
an increase in , will make the anti-reformer to contribute more. From equation 19, it is
straightforward to obtain condition (iv), which states how anti-reform lobby's
contributions changes when the size of its rival,

4, changes.

1

if - 8
f2 CO

iv)

<

>-

d# <

Suppose the original equilibrium of the game is similar to the one depicted in figure V.5,
an increase in parameter

f will

shift the reaction curve of the pro-reform lobby outward

in such a way that CP rises unambiguously, but the final effect on Ca is unknown. Figure
V.6 shows these changes. Depending on the magnitude of the shift of Lobby p's reaction
curve, anti-reform contributions will end up at a point like b, where they increase, or at a
point like c, where they decrease.
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The equilibrium in point b explains a situation where the size of lobby A, 0, was large
enough in equilibrium to make it compete with the increase in pro-reform contributions.
Point c, on the contrary, represents an equilibrium where 0 was relatively small, initially,
reducing the anti-reform lobby's willingness to compete against a stronger adversary.
RP

RP,

45°

RP

C^

b

CA*

A

CA'*

CP* CP"*
Figure V.6

CP

CP'*

Setting d = 0 and applying Cramer's rule, I get equations 20 and 21, which represent
how the level of contributions of the lobbies is affected by changes in the expected utility
differential of Lobby A.
(+)

(-)

1
dC

A_

2

CO

11

1 ~

2
)

--

2

1 ~CO~ 2

~2

C

>

-0(20)

(+)

dC^
=

A2

2

>0

-

(21)

(+)

Proposition V
An increase in the size (utility differential) of the anti-reform lobby, 6, holding constant
the size of the pro-reform lobby, , leads to
(a)

an increase in anti-reform contributions,C".
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(b)

an increase or decrease in the pro-reform level of contributions,C' depending
b.1. on the originalsize of the pro-reform lobby, 0
b.2. on the initiallevel of anti-reform contributionsC'.

Intuitively, if the membership of lobby A increases, its affiliates exert a greater demand
for rejection. The anti-reform lobby end up contributing more to keep the status quo. The
reaction of its rival would depend on its ability to compete determine by the size of its
membership and the level of contributions of his opponent. For very high levels of
and/or low levels of CA, the pro-reform lobby is relatively large and reacts to the increase
in the size of its rival, providing more contributions. The opposite happens for low levels
of # and/or high levels CA. These results are summarized in condition v:
r

v)

dC' >0
O - 0
d>

>

11

<1

if 1

2 C"

d

<

<

Figure V.7 shows the effect of an increase in 0 when the original equilibrium is such that
CA* exceeds Cl*. If originally, lobby p is not large enough (either

4 is very low or CA

is

very high), an increase in the size of the anti-reform lobby, 0, would increase CA and
reduce CP. The final equilibrium is given by point b and CA*, and CP*' represent the new
levels of contributions.
CA
RP

45°
b

CA'* --

-

-

A

R

a

- - - -

R

CP'*

CP*

Figure V.7
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CP

During the Dominican reform process, the anti-reform lobby reacted in similar fashion
when public opinion began to turn against the reform. One can conveniently argue that as
public opinion turn to favor the status-quo, the membership of the anti-reform block

enhanced, exerting pressure to increase contributions . However, the reaction of the proreform lobby was not to decrease contributions as the model predicts, but to increase
them. This may suggest that when public opinion turned against the reform, the proreform block considered the President to be weak (not too committed to reform) while its
rival considered him to be strong. Let's move to the overall game and the choice of the
President.
V.5. The Overall Game: The Final Solution
The lobbying-contest is a reduced-form contest within the overall game. In the general
framework, the President leads the lobbies and incorporates to his expected net benefit
function, the equilibrium levels of contribution, CP* and CA*. Equation 32 shows the
expected net benefit for the President, E(Bp):

E(Bp) = q*(Ca*,Cp*)UP (2 = 0)+ [1-q* (C"*,Cp*)]UP(2 =
exp ected gains from liberalization

Zq)

-UP(j =

-

F (32)

exp ected gains
from status quo

F represents a fixed cost incurred by the President when making a proposal. One can
think of F as an opportunity cost that arises when P is distracted from other activities.
Alternatively, F can be interpreted as the cost of elaborating and organizing a proposal.
Hence, submitting a policy is not free of sacrifice. There will be cases in which the
President will opt for keeping the status quo. Moreover his decision will depend on a

3'In the Dominican Republic,

the anti-reform block was originally formed by CONEP, the National
Council of Enterprises Men. As public opinion turn against the reform, several organized groups jumped
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comparison between the expected gains under the two policy alternatives. Let's rewrite
equation 32 to establish the conditions in which a proposal will be made:

E(B,) =q*V-F

(33)

q* = CP*/(CP*+ Ca*) and y = [UP (0)-UP (Xsq)]

Where:

Proposition VI
If q * V is greater(lower) than F,the President's expected net benefit is positive
(negative), so he will make a proposal (not make a proposal).

Given that F and y are constants, the President's proposal depends directly on q*, which
is determined in the lobbying game. Therefore, the reduced-form contest indirectly
influence the overall game. In the next section, I present the effect of changes in the size
of the lobbies the decision-making process of the President.
V.6. The President 's Choice and the Utility Differential of the Lobbies
Equation 13 contains the Nash Equilibrium of the model in terms of the size of the
lobbies,

# and 0.

Plugging 13 into 32 allow us to rewrite the expected net benefit of the

President in terms of the relevant parameters3:

E(Bp)= -

The effect of a change in

-F

(34)

4 over the expected net benefit
dE(B)
d#

-

>0
(O-#)2

t+)

into the anti-reform wagon increasing the size of the lobby.
32 See section A.5.3 in the appendix.
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of the President is given by:

(35)

To obtain the effect of a change in the anti-reform lobby utility differential, 0, over the
expected net benefit of the President, I get dE(BP)/dO from the total differentiation of

equation 34.

dE(

d8

a( O )v
(8-0)2

>0

(36)

Proposition VII
An increase in the size of the pro-reform lobby, , increasesthe expected net benefit of
the Presidentand his willingness to propose. An increase in the absolute value of the
utility differential (increasein its size) of the anti-reform lobby decreases the President's
expected net benefit and his willingness to propose.
Intuitively, the larger the pro-reform lobby the more it contribute, increasing the

probability of Congress' approval. Provided it is more likely the reform will pass, the
President's willingness to propose, increases. On the contrary, the larger the size of the
anti-reform lobby, the more it contribute against the policy, reducing the probability of
Congress approval. Hence the President's willingness to propose, decreases.
Proposition VIII
Let j and 0 be the levels of # and 0that makes the expected net benefit of the President,
E(BP), equal to zero. Then, for a given fixed cost F and utility differential, y,
(a) values of # below .0 or | q above |_ makes q * V< F, so the expected net benefit for
the Presidentbecomes negative and there is no proposal.
(b) values of # above

0 or |j

below |_6 makes q * V>

F, so the expected net benefit for

the Presidentbecomes positive and he proposes to Congress.
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Figures V.8 (a) and V.8 (b) summarize the findings presented in proposition VIII. The
shapes of the curves are given by the slopes found in equations 35 and 36.

E(BP

E(BP

E(BP)>O

E(BP)>O

E(B)<

1
Figure V.8(a)

Notice

E(BP)<0

101

Figure V.8(b)

and 0 constitute minimum sizes of lobbies after which the President will make a

proposal. These minimum sizes are affected by changes in the actual size of the lobbies.
For instance an increase in the size of Lobby A,

101, decreases

the expected net benefit of

the President and his willingness to propose. Thus the minimum size of the pro-reform
lobby required to make the President propose, C becomes larger. Parameter I is affected
by changes in the actual size of the anti-reform lobby, 10j. Using a similar reasoning, one
can argue that |1j is affected by changes in the actual size of the pro-reform lobby, .
Proposition IX
Let 0 = H(| 6) and |

= J(),then H'( 69)>O and J q>0.An increase in the size of the

anti-reform (pro-reform)lobby leads to an increase in the minimum pro-reform
(minimum anti-reform) lobby size, neededfor the Presidentto make a proposal.

Figure V.9 (a) illustrates the effect of an increase in

101

on the President's expected net

benefit. The shift to the right of the E(Bp) curve makes P receives a lower expected net
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benefit per size of the pro-reform lobby,

P. Intuitively,

as Lobby A has more to loose if

the reform is enacted, it contributes more, reducing the probability of Congress approval.
The President is aware it is less likely the reform will pass. Thus the minimum size of the
pro-reform lobby after which the President propose, increases.

E(Bp

E(Bp
E(BP)[0,]

E(Bp)[# 21
E(BP)[#

11

E(BP)O21
E(Bp)>Q

(BP)>0
E(Bp)<O

8
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0

E(Bp)<0

Figure V.9(a)

Figure V.9(b)

Graph V.9 (b) shows the effects of an increase in the actual size of the pro-reform lobby,
#, on the minimum anti-reform lobby's size required for a proposal. Notice the shift of
the expected net benefit curve increases

181 to 101'.

The President receives a higher

expected net benefit per level of anti-reform lobby's size, so he will propose in a wider
range of cases than before.
V.7. The Actual Probability of Reform and the Utility Differential of the Lobbies
Recall a proposal is not viable for values of 4 below

I

and Oj1 above Q01 since the

President's expected net benefit is negative. For such values, the actual probability of
reform, q, is equal to zero. For the same reasons, values of

above

I and 1Oe below 101

generate a positive expected net benefit for the President thus the actual probability of
reform,

q, becomes positive. Moreover,

for such lobbies' sizes, q, should be exactly equal
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to the probability of Congress approval, q. Be aware that

_is different from q, the

probability of Congress approval.
Figure V.10 illustrates the relationship between the actual probability of reform,
and 0. The shape and curvature

g, and the parameters that define the size of the lobbies,
above I and

of the graphs for levels of

01 below

Qj0 is given by the signs found in

equations 37 to 40.

dq

-

_

d#

dq

> 0 (37)

d8

(0-#)2

#___

-

d# 2

-

___

20

(39)

(+)

(-)

d- 2 q

>0

(B-#)2

<0

d___
2

(38)

d q=-

d

(8-s)

_q

2

>0

(40)

(6-)

_q

_q(O)

4)
Figure V.10(a)

jQJ101
Figure V.10(b)

Something that deserves additional explanation is the effect of small changes in the size
of the lobbies over _, when 101 is close to
there is a jump in

flj and

# is close to 1. It must be explained why

_jlike those observed in figures V.10(a) and V.10(b). While the

President is playing status-quo, the dominant strategy, the lobbies are continuously
contributing to Congress amounts that corresponds to lobbies' sizes below
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I

and/or above

If. Congress is more willing to approve the reform than otherwise would be. The
probability of Congress approval is already positive and becoming larger as
move toward

101

and

#

IQfi and 1. As soon as the game reaches these values, the President proposes.

At this stage, the actual probability of reform, q, becomes equal to the probability of
Congress approval, q, which is already is very high.
V.8. Conclusion
This paper presented the case of a President, committed to reform, who is allowed to
choose between total liberalization and status-quo. Unless the opportunity cost of
reforming is very high, the President will opt for liberalization. In his reform attempt, the
President leads two opposing lobbies, which play a simultaneous move lobbying game.
The reduced-form lobbying game yields three possible unique equilibrium depending on
the relative size of the lobbies. A Nash equilibrium where the membership of Lobby A
exceeds the number of affiliates to lobby p is more representative of the Dominican
reform process. Despite the equilibrium chosen, an increase in the size of the membership
of a lobby, increases its own contributions. It also increase or decrease the contributions
of its rival depending on the relative size of its membership and the initial level of
contribution of the lobbies. The model shows a strong President will be more (less)
willing to propose the greater the size of the pro-reform (anti-reform) lobby.
Finally, I was able to show there exist minimum lobbies' sizes,

I

and l1, after

which the President is willing to propose. A proposition implies a cost for the President
when he is distracted from other important issues. Therefore, the President will propose
only if his allied, the pro-reform lobby, is large enough to compete with his adversary, the
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anti-reform lobby. The next chapter contains the main conclusions of this dissertation
and recommend direction for further research.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS AND POSSIBLE EXTENSIONS
The main objective of this dissertation was to provide an analytical framework to study
the politics behind structural adjustments in the Dominican Republic. Based on a country

study presented in chapters II and III, I developed two theoretical models that analyze
bargaining over economic reform under very specific conditions. A welfare maximizer
president submits a tariff bill to a Congress dominated by the opposition. His decision is
indirectly affected by a previously played lobbying game.
Chapter IV presented the first model where a weak President chose a policy
reform from a continuum of alternatives. Prior to the policy submission to the National
Assembly, two opposing lobbies played a reduced-form game in which they acted as
Stackelberg leaders vis a vis the President. The lobbying game yielded two possible cases
of linear equilibrium. The first is an equilibrium where lobbies regard each other's
contributions as strategic complements. Thus, the optimal response of a lobby to an
aggressive move (increase contributions) by its rival, was to also act more aggressively
(increase contributions). The second possible equilibrium is one where only the proreform lobby p views the contributions of its adversary as strategic substitutes. Hence,
the optimal response of the pro-reformer to more aggressive play by the anti-reformer is
to be less aggressive. Following Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985), the
existence of such an equilibrium is only possible if the anti-reform lobby, the player who
regards its opponent's contributions as strategic complements, is larger than the proreform lobby, the player who views the contributions of its rival as strategic substitutes.
Chapter II discusses the historical background of protectionism in the Dominican
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Republic and provides ample evidence of the benefits of protectionism for this particular
country.
The second model presented in chapter V considered a strong President, who is

allowed a discrete choice between total liberalization and a protectionist status-quo. In
this case, the President leads the lobbies when attempting reform and incorporates the
reduced-form game solution into his decision-making process. The lobbying game was
modeled as a tariff contest where two contenders, the pro-reform lobby and the antireform lobby, simultaneously chose a level of effort (contributions) to pursue a prize

(their favored policy). The chances of winning such a prize were given by the probability
of obtaining Congress approval. The lobbying game yielded three possible cases of
unique equilibrium, dependent on the size of the lobbies. A larger lobby provided a larger
amount of contributions in equilibrium. An asymmetric equilibrium where the larger,
more experience and powerful anti-reform lobby contributes more, is more representative
of the Dominican reform process. Following Dixit (1987), Lobby A would become "a
favorite" in the tariff contest since the probability of Congress passing the tariff bill is
below 50 % in the Nash equilibrium.
The most important findings of the models can be summarized as follows:
.

A strong president will always pursue total liberalization unless the cost incurred

when distracted from other important issues exceeds the benefit drawn from
liberalizing. In the second model, this is obvious since the expected net benefit of the
Executive is negative only if F, the fixed cost of distraction, is greater than qyx, the
benefit of the President represented by his utility differential times the probability of
Congress approval.
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+

There exists optimal minimum sizes of lobbies,

I

and

1__,
after which a President's

proposal is viable. In countries where either the pro-reform lobby is relatively small
or the anti-reform lobby is considerably large, a reform will not be submitted to

Congress, regardless of the level of commitment of the President. This constitutes a
plausible explanation for delayed reforms in developing countries, particularly in
Latin America, where the application of an inward-oriented development strategy
allowed protectionist groups to become extremely powerful. Moreover, it is possible
to present an argument to explain why in these countries necessary adjustments are

postponed until a period of crisis. Under an extreme situation, the number of
individuals questioning the status-quo grows rapidly, so does the number of affiliates
to the lobby that support the modification of the status quo.
*

When the President is weak and Congress is formed by self-driven politicians, a
change in public opinion against the reform (an increase in P) causes a decrease in
anti-reform contributions. The anti-reform lobby knows Congress needs less of a
bribe to reject the policy and it is also aware the President is not deeply committed to
reform. The pro-reform lobby's reaction, on the other hand, depends on two factors:
the level of commitment of the President and how the effect of the change in public
opinion compares to the effect of a policy change over the marginal profitability of
the pro-reformer. The less committed to reform the President is, the more likely
Lobby p will increase contributions. The more sensitive the profitability of the proreform lobby to policy changes, and the less sensitive it is to public opinion, the more
likely it is that Lobby p will increase contributions.
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+

When the President is strong and committed to reform, an increase in the size of the
pro-reform lobby, c , leads to an increase in pro-reform contributions. The increase in
the membership of the lobby that supports reform implies a greater effort to get the

policy approved. Hence, it increases the probability of obtaining Congress approval,
motivating the President to propose the reform policy. The effect of an increase in the
size of the pro-reform lobby on the contributions of Lobby A depends on how able to
compete the anti-reform lobby is. The larger the size of the anti-reform lobby, 0,
and/or its contributions, CA, the more likely Lobby A will be competitive and
contribute more.
*

An alternative interpretation of the increase in 0 allows a comparison between the
comparative static results of the two models. Suppose the increase in the membership
of the anti-reform lobby, 0, occurs as a response to the change in public opinion
against the reform. Model II explains that with more affiliates, Lobby A has more to
lose from the enactment of the tariff bill, so it decides to contribute more to block it.
This outcome contradicts the one found in model I. Notice that the anti-reform lobby
is more willing to compete (increase contributions) when it considers the President to
be committed to reform. On the contrary if the lobby considers P to be weak it relaxes
and lets the new viewpoint of public opinion affect the decision of the President.
Regarding lobby p, an increase in the size of the membership of lobby A (T 081)
generates an uncertain reaction that depends on its initial size,

4),

and the level of

contributions of lobby A, CA. For relatively low levels of pro-reform contributions,
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Cp, and size,

4, one should

expect a disillusioned Lobby p to decrease its

contributions. Again, this outcome contradicts the one found in model I.

One can conclude that the reaction of the lobbies to a shift in public opinion in
favor of protectionism depends on how committed to reform the President is. During the
Dominican affair in 1996, both lobbies reacted with a more aggressive behavior to the
change in public opinion. It should be the case that while the anti-reform lobby led by
CONEP (National Council of Enterprises Men) considered President Fernandez to be
strongly committed to reform, the pro-reform block led by UNE (National Union of
Entrepreneurs) was not convinced of the President's willingness to support reform.
The theoretical models supported not only events that affected the adjustment
process in the Dominican Republic, but also political negotiations in several Latin
American countries characterized by a lack of institutionalism and periodic economic and
political crises. For the last 15 years, these countries have been immersed in reform
processes, most of which were submitted through a Presidential initiative but blocked by
an opposition Congress. Frequently, anti-reform lobbies contributed to make the
liberalization process more gradual, whereas pro-reform lobbies have been generally
supportive of the natural adjustment process. In extreme cases, such as Peru, a President
dissolved Congress and used executive decrees to enforce the measures. It is undeniable
that this course of action is typical of a dictatorial government, but we must understand
why sometimes in the region, governors are willing to reach such extremes. Weak
institutions and authoritarianism make it practically impossible to get reforms approved
through the proper democratic channels.
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The models presented in this dissertation constitute an initial stage in a broader agenda of

research. A straightforward extension of the first model is to rule out the weakness of the
President, letting him become a Stackelberg leader vis a vis the lobbies. Notice this case
differs from the second framework presented in this dissertation since the latter
comprised a discrete choice model. Another possible extension of the second model is to
convert the follower lobbies into Stackelberg leaders and let them endogenize the

decision-making process of the President. This setting will differ from the first model in
the elimination of the continuum of choices.
Other possible extensions arise from the endogenization of the behavior of
Congress. It is possible to develop a game between the President and the Congress, where
the behavior of the lobbies is determined exogenously. Such a game can be played either
using a continuum of choices or within a discrete framework. A future line of work will
be to incorporate a probabilistic voting setting to the models and convert the President
into a self-interested politician. This would transform the game into a general equilibrium
political model where all political actors behave rationally and follow their own selfinterests.
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APPENDIX

TABLE A.3.1
Dominican Republic
The 1990 Tariff Reform

-Important ChangesPre-Reform

After-Reform

Import Tariffs are determined by 26

-

special and fiscal Laws and one tariff

instrument, the new tariff law.

legislation, Law 170 of 1970.

-

Though 99% of export tax revenue comes
from two taxes, there are 15 different

*

The majority of export taxes were
eliminated.

There are four types of rates applied to

*

imports: ad-valorem, specific, composed

All taxes are collected through an advalorem rate.

and mixed.

-

Tariff exemptions and concessions are

More than 50 exemptions and concessions
were eliminated.

provided by different laws: 299 of

-

Industrial Protection; 153 for the

Prohibitions, quotas and licenses were
considerably reduced.

Development of Tourism; 409 for

-

Tariffs are applied under a C.I.F. value.

Agroindustrial Development; and 69 of

*

Valuation of all imports is made through a

Export Promotion.
*

Eight different level of tariffs: 3%, 5%,
10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 30% and 35%.

export taxes.

-

Import taxes are consolidated in a single

unified exchange rate.

There are multiple prohibitions, licenses,
quotas and special authorizations.

-

Tariffs are applied under value F.O.B.

*

Valuation of many imports is made
through a preferential exchange rate.
Source: New Tariff Law of September 1993; Schenone and Guilliany Cury (1991).
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TABLE A.3.2
Dominican Republic
The 1992 Tax Reform
-Important ChangesTax
Personal and
Business

Income Tax
(ISR)

Pre-Reform Stage

Post-Reform Stage

Law 5911 of National Income of
1962.

Law 11-92 of Universal Rent

No inflation adjustments

Inflation adjustments

Deductible marginal benefits

Taxable marginal benefits

Deductible interests

Only individuals have deductible
interests

Exemptions and concessions

Elimination of exemptions and
concessions

16 different tax rates for
individuals from 3% to 70%

3 tax rates for individuals from 15
to 30%

10 tax rates for businesses from 10
to 46%

A single tax rate of 30% for
businesses gradually reduced to

25%
Value Added
Tax (ITBIS)

Selective Taxes

Law 74

Law 11-92

Tax rate of 6%

Tax rate of 8%

No inflation adjustments

Inflation adjustments

More than 30 laws and 100 goods

Law 11-92 and around 20 goods

Specific taxes to alcohol and
tobacco

Ad-valorem of 10% to alcohol and
tobacco

Specific taxes for imported goods

Ad-valorem from 5% to 80% for

to Domestic
Consumption

imports of goods

Some specific taxes for services

Ad- valorem of 5%, 10% and 20%
for services

Gradual elimination of exchange
Exchange commission (recargo
cambiario) of 20% for exports and
commission (recargo cambiario)
in four years
imports
Source: Law 11-92, New Tax Code of the Dominican Republic.

Trade Taxes
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TABLA A.3.3

Dominican Republic
The 1996 Economic Reforms
Stabilization
+
Unification
of the
exchange
rate at a
level of RD$
14/U$. The
rate will be
adjusted to
maintain the
same level
as in the free
market.*
.

Increase and
fluctuation
of fuel
prices
depending
on the
behavior of
the
exchange
rate and the
international
price of
petroleum.*

f

*

*

Most Im ortant Measures
Compensation
Liberalization
The minimum
*
Items that are
wage in the
taxed at rates of
government is
35, 30 and 25%
increased from
will be subject to
RD$ 1014a tariff of 20%.
monthly to RD$
Items that are
1400-.*
actually taxed at
20 and 15% will
Teachers,
be taxed at 10%.
physicians,
Items that are
nurses,
taxed at 10% will
agronomists,
pay 5% and those
judges,
at 5% will pay
legislators and
3%.
others will
receive increases
*
Imports of
in salaries
material,
between 40 and
equipment and
150%.*
machinery for
farming will be
A subsidy for
taxed at 1.5%.
public
transportation to
avoid an
increase in the
cost of public
transport.*

______________
_________________

_________________

Source: President Speech, December 20, 1996.
* were applied through Executive decrees.
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*

Tax Reform
Rate of personal
income tax is reduced
from 25% to 10% and
the tax-free band is
raised from RD$
60,000 to RD$ 80,000
a year.

*

A tax of 1% on gross
assets.

*

Two partials fiscal
amnesties.

*

All exemptions
included in special
contracts of the
Dominican state with
companies will be left
without effect.

"

ITBIS is increase to
12% in 1997 and its
base is enhanced.

*

An increase in the
selective tax on
consumption of
alcoholic beverages
and cigarettes to 50%
and beer to 40%.

"

The petroleum
differential is
substituted by a
selective tax of
constant value express
in pesos per gallon of
gasoline.

TABLE A.3.4
Dominican Republic
Radiography of Political Actors
Interest

-Their Role in the 1997
Anti-Reform

Budget ProcessPro-reform

Group

Political
Parties

Revolutionary Dominican Party (PRD)
A party founded in 1936 by members of the
exile during the Trujillo era. It is associated
to The International Socialist. PRD has been
in power three times. The first time with
Professor Juan Bosch in 1963 in a
government deposed by a coup in seven
months. It also ruled the nation in
consecutive period between 1978 and 1986.
Its leader and presidential candidate in 1996

Dominican LiberationParty (PLD)
Founded in 1973 by Juan Bosch after
a PRD's division. It took power for
the first time in 1996 with Dr.
Leonel Fernandez. Though it was
founded as a lefty party it moved
toward center in the mid-nineties.
Being born from PRD's quitters, it
considers that party its most hated
rival.

was Dr. Jose Francisco Pena G6mez.

Business

Associations

National Council of Private Enterprises
(CONEP)
It is a renovation of the old National Council
of Businessmen (CNHE) founded in 1962 to
fight for the old incentive legislation. It is the
most powerful and organized lobbying group
in the country and mainly industrialists form
it. At the moment of the 1996 affair, his
president was Celso Marranzini.

National Union of Entrepreneurs
(UNE)
Formed by a group of final goods
importers and members of the
commercial sector that defected from
the old CNHE. His president during
the submission of the second wave
of reforms was Dr. Andres Dauhajre,
an importer, and father of the
economist with the same name,
leader of the pro-reform private
consulting group. UNE does not
posses near the power to match

forces with CONEP.

Private
Economic

Consultants

Ecocaribe-SigloXXI
Though in the anti-reform group during the
budget conflict, economists in these two
firms are not really opposed to structural
reforms. They were in opposition of some of
the measures and the way in which was
implemented the second wave. Economists
such as Eduardo Garcia Michel, Isidoro
Santana, Manuel Cocco and Angeles Calzada
Have been studying the Dominican economy
for several years. Some of them have
occupied important public positions. Their
position since the beginning was to separate
the budget from the other economic reforms.
Ecocaribe also made a tariff proposal for
AIRD that was the one assumed by CONEP

in July 1997.
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FoundationEconomics and
Development (FeyD)
Lead by Andres Dauhajre, hijo, it
defended the reforms since a great
proportion of it was elaborated at the
institution. Dr. Dauhajre and his
economists were more vocal
defending the reform that most
public officials. The center was
founded in the late-eighties and it is
pro-market and trade-oriented. The
group has been really determined to
bring down the status quo and it has
been confronted really powerful
groups.

Table A.3.5
Dominican Republic
Comparison of Original Government Package

"

"
"

-

m

*

and Amendments after Negotiations with CONEP
Before
After
Value-added tax rate rise to 12% in
Value-added tax rate rise to 11%

1997.
VAT rises to 14% in 1998 and __% in
1999.
It enhances ITBIS tax base.
Alcohol and tobacco taxes rises to 40
and 50%.
Corporate income tax reduced from

-

in 1997.
Only rises in 1997.
It abandons plan to extend the tax
base for ITBIS.
Selective taxes on tobacco and
alcohol are scale down.
Corporate income tax states at the

25% to 10% while abolishing
deductions from depreciation and

same level allowing for deductions
in depreciation and interest

interest payments.

payments.

Maximum tariff is reduced from 35 to
20% in 1997 and then gradually until
10% in 1999.
It introduces a 1% tax on firm's gross
assets.
Minimum wage is increased up to RD$
1400 monthly.
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*

*

*

Maximum tariff rate is reduced
from 35% to 20% and not
anymore.
I% tax on gross assets is
eliminated.
Minimum wage is increased to
RD$ 1500 monthly.

A.4.1. Signs of the Elements in the Pro-reform Lobby Reaction Function Slope
Let's start by analyzing elements in the denominator of equation 11. Fc'cp and Fx are
negative given our assumptions about the function E(BLP) = F(k, CP). The solution for

these partials yield:
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a.4.1.F

,

S2q

=[
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}+>

(+)(-)(+

tSq

;->

)+#'(,)

]

d

9C'' dC'

'

+

1)2q

Cp 2

W+

()±+

d 2,
dC"

W+

cog

(->

t+)

[#(,Z)-+#'(2) q ] < 0
9

(+)
(+)

a.4.2

(-)

F. = [#(2)

(+)

+ '(2) q] < 0

(By assumption)

All but two of the elements in a.4.1 have their signs defined: 6 2q/6X6CP, which is assume
negative and dX/dCP which is endogenously obtained from the President's problem. The
former assumption determines how changes in pro-reform contributions affect the slope
of q with respect to k. We assume an increase in CP makes q less sensitive to increases in
the share of tariff revenue

6q/&k becomes

k. That is, 6 2q/66CP < 0. Graph A.4.1

flatter as CP increases.

q
q= 1

ksq

Graph A.4.1
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X

shows how the slope

To find the second missed element dk/dCP, we use P's maximization problem represented
by equation 2. Furthermore, we get an expression for dk/dCA which is also an element in
the numerator.

Max

E(B)

=

q(2,C',CA )W(2)+[1

q(2,Co,CA)]W(2'q)

(2)

Then:

a.4.3

d

dCp dC"=O

= -

<0
[/1]

(+))
(+)

d=-

a.4.4

dC^

where

p+=[

>0
[,u]

dC=0

q V( ) +2[ V'(2)
(+)
(-)

q] <0

+
(

(+)

+)

Equation a.4.4 presents one new element with undefined sign, the cross partial
6 2q/6k6CA. This term states how a change in the level of anti-reform lobby contributions
affect the sensitivity of q to changes in

k.

That is, how an increase in CA affects the slope

6q/6k. A graphical representation would imply that the slope becomes steeper or q
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becomes more sensitive to

X given

an increase in anti-reform contributions. Our

interpretation makes 6 2q/6X6CA positive, so will be the numerator in a.4.4.

q
q= 1
q(X)

Graph A.4.1

ksq

The last unknown term in the denominator of equation 11 is Fxcj, which is negative
under our assumption that 6 2q/6X6CP is negative. FxcP is equal to:

(+))

H2

a.4.5.

FR,

d

#(1/+#'( ) d

=[

<0

dC'

ScKSC'

Now let's focus on the numerator. Given our assumptions and previous demonstrations,
Fx,<0, dk/dC < and dX/dCA > 0. The partials FcPx, F x and FxcA are given by the
following expression:
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r2q

+>

,

(2)+#'(2)

C'S2dC'

dq

>

]-0

<

As we can see Fc~x has an ambiguous sign provided 6 2q/6CP6X < 0. That means as X
increases toward

2

jq,

a dollar of contribution from the pro-reform lobby is less effective

affecting Congress behavior. Furthermore, for the other lobby, in the neighborhood of the
status quo (when q --> 1), the slope 6q/6CA becomes flatter, so 616q/6CA l/,

is

negative, what means 62 q/6CA6X is positive. Graphs A.4.3 and A.4.4 illustrate how as X
tends to

2

5q, the slope given by

6q/6C'

, where i = {A, p}is affected.

q

q

q=1

q=1

Graph A.4.4

CP

Cps

Graph A.4.3

CAsq CA

Plugging equation a.4.6 in a.4.7, we can rewrite it as a.4.9 and show that regardless of the
sign assumed by FcP;, the element in bracket [F?, dX/dCP + FcPj] is positive:
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Finally, equation a.4.8 contains the element FcPCA, which sign depends on the cross

partial 6 2q/6CPCA. This term explains how the sensitivity of q with respect to pro-reform
contributions is affected through an increase in anti-reform funding.
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is negative, then FcPCA is also negative what means the pro-

reformer perceives the other lobby contributions as a strategic substitute. In the next sub-

section A.4.2, we compute the partial derivatives that are components of the slope of the
anti-reform lobby reaction function.
A.4.2. Signs of the Elements in the Slope of the Anti-reform Reaction Function
Given our assumptions and the signs obtained in section A. 1., we already know that
p/dC
<0

GCACA < 0, Gx>0, dk/dCA > 0, d

and Gx < 0. The computation of GX allow us

to obtain the second partials G CP, GxcA and G,. We get:
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As expected, the sign of the denominator of the anti-reform lobby reaction function is
unambiguously negative, a necessary condition for an interior solution. The other
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expressions we must estimate in equation 14 are GCACA, GCAx and GCACP. The

computation of these components yield:
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Using a.4.11 and a.4.12 we are able to rewrite GCACAs:
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Under our assumptions the sign of GCAa is unambiguously negative and the sign of GCACP
depends on 62q/6CA6CP or how the slope aq/6CA changes when CP changes. We assume

62q/aCA6CP is negative what makes GCACP positive. The third section of this appendix
compute some mixed partials needed to show uniqueness in the model.
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A.4.3. Computation of the Mixed Partials to Show Uniqueness
The four relevant mixed partial equations presented in condition ii) of the paper are
computed in this section of the appendix. The results are:
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As we can see there is no much we can say about a.4.20 being greater than a.4.21 or
equation a.4.22 being greater than a.4.23, without making any extra assumptions.
Showing uniqueness with this method is not a straightforward procedure.

A.4.4. Signs of the Mixed Partials with respect to Parameter P
Let start by getting Fxp and Fc~p (the partials of Fx and cP with respect to 3). I also obtain
from the President's problem the element dX/dp. The results are presented in equations

a.4.24 to a.4.26:
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Observe the signs of equations a.4.24 to a.4.26 require some extra assumptions. I assume
6 2q/6XfP > 0 and 6 2q/8CPfP < 0 and justify these assumptions in the next section A.4.5,
with a diagrammatic approach.
For the anti-reform lobby, the missed elements in equation 23 are GA and GcA .
Equations a.4.27 and a.4.28 show the estimation of these mixed partials with their
respective signs. One extra assumption is required to obtain an unambiguous sign for
these partials. That is, 8 2q/6CAp > 0. This assumption is also justified in the next section
of the appendix. Please notice that as public opinion turn against the reform, Congress
behavior becomes more sensitive to anti-reform funding and less influenced by proreform contributions
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A.4.5. Justification of Assumptions About Mixed Partials with respect to P
Equations a.4.24 to a.4.26 contain new elements represented by the mixed partials with
respect to parameter

R. Some

extra assumptions are required to be able to reach some

conclusions in our comparative static section. The elements with undefined signs are
62 q/6Xpf, 6 2q/6CP6P and 6 2q/6CA6P. The first element explains how the sensitivity of q
with respect to

X changes,

when parameter

P increases.

In other words, how, as public

opinion turns against the reform, the slope 6q/6X changes. Graph A.4.5 helps us to
explain such movements.

Let's say the reform consists on a share of
tariff revenue reduction from X' to X'. The
original function q(k) show us how the
decreases the probability of
2
Congress approval from q' to q . Now, as
public opinion turns against the reform,
that is as P increases, the slope q/6?
becomes steeper and the new function is
say, q(X)'. With this new function, the effect
of the policy over q is greater. Therefore
2
q/6~p should be positive.

q
q) q(
9(policy
q2
q
q

2

Graph A.4.5
The other two elements 6 2q/5CP6P and 6 2q/6CA5P explains how a change in public
opinion that favors protectionism affects the slope of q with respect to lobbies'
contributions. Graph A.4.6 and A.4.7 show how these slopes responds to an increase in
parameter

P. As public opinion turns against

the reform, the probability of Congress

approval, q, becomes more sensitive to anti-reform contributions and less sensitive to
pro-reform funding. That is 6 2q/6CP6P should be negative whilst 6 2q/6CA6p should be
positive.
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Graph A.4.6
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A.5.1 Estimating Conditions for Different Equilibrium Levels.
Recall our equilibrium equation represented by equation 13:
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We use equation 13 to figure out the conditions under which CP exceeds, equates or is
below CA.
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From the last expression, we can summarize the three possible cases as follow:
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A.5.2. Conditions for a Positive Determinant
Let do some algebraic manipulation to obtain the conditions under which the determinant
presented in equation 17 yields a positive sign.
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For such equation to be positive it should be true that:
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We can reduce this expression as follows:
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A.5.3. The President's Expected Net Benefit as a function of the Parameters
We plug the equilibrium values found in equation 13 in the President's expected net
benefit problem represented by E(BP) = qyl -F and obtain:
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Equation 34 is the one used for the final solution of the overall game.
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